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Monetary Policy Alternatives 
at the Zero Bound: 
An Empirical Assessment
The conventional instrument of monetary policy in most major
industrial economies is the very short term nominal interest rate, such as
the overnight federal funds rate in the case of the United States. The use
of this instrument, however, implies a potential problem: Because cur-
rency (which pays a nominal interest rate of zero) can be used as a store of
value, the short-term nominal interest rate cannot be pushed below zero.
Should the nominal rate hit zero, the real short-term interest rate—at that
point equal to the negative of prevailing inﬂation expectations—may be
higher than the rate needed to ensure stable prices and the full utilization
of resources. Indeed, an unstable dynamic may result if the excessively
high real rate leads to downward pressure on costs and prices that, in turn,
raises the real short-term interest rate, which depresses activity and prices
further, and so on.
Japan has suffered from the problems created by the zero lower bound
(ZLB) on the nominal interest rate in recent years, and short-term rates in
countries such as the United States and Switzerland have also come uncom-
fortably close to zero. As a consequence, the problems of conducting mone-
tary policy when interest rates approach zero have elicited considerable
attention from the economics profession. Some contributions have framed the
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2581-01_Bernanke_rev.qxd    1/18/05    13:13    Page  1problem in a formal general equilibrium setting; another strand of the lit-
erature identiﬁes and discusses the policy options available to central
banks when the zero bound is binding.1
Although there have been quite a few theoretical analyses of alterna-
tive monetary policy strategies at the ZLB, systematic empirical evidence
on the potential efﬁcacy of alternative policies is scant. Knowing whether
the proposed alternative strategies would work in practice is important to
central bankers, not only because such knowledge would help guide poli-
cymaking in extremis, but also because the central bank’s choice of its
long-run inﬂation objective depends importantly on the perceived risks
created by the ZLB. The greater the conﬁdence of central bankers that
tools exist to help the economy escape the ZLB, the less need there is to
maintain an inﬂation “buffer,” and hence the lower the inﬂation objective
can be.2
This paper uses the methods of modern empirical ﬁnance to assess the
potential effectiveness of so-called nonstandard monetary policies at the
zero bound. We are interested particularly in whether such policies would
work in modern industrial economies (as opposed to, for example, the
same economies during the Depression era), and so our focus is on the
recent experience of the United States and Japan.
The paper begins by noting that, although the recent improvement in
the global economy and the receding of near-term deﬂation risks may
have reduced the salience of the ZLB today, this constraint is likely to
continue to trouble central bankers for the foreseeable future. Central
banks in the industrial world have exhibited a strong commitment to
keeping inﬂation low, but inﬂation can be difﬁcult to predict. Although
low inﬂation has many beneﬁts, it also raises the risk that adverse shocks
will drive interest rates to the ZLB.
Whether hitting the ZLB presents a minor annoyance or a major risk
for monetary policy depends on the effectiveness of the policy alterna-
2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
1. Examples of the ﬁrst approach include Woodford (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003a, 2003b), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002), and Auerbach and Obstfeld
(2004); examples of the second include Blinder (2000), Bernanke (2002), Clouse and oth-
ers (2003), and Bernanke and Reinhart (2004).
2. Phelps (1972), Summers (1991), and Fischer (1996) have noted the relevance of the
ZLB to the determination of the optimal inﬂation rate. Coenen, Orphanides, and Wieland
(2004) and Adam and Billi (2004) provide simulation evidence on the link between the
ZLB and the optimal inﬂation rate.
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of the present authors,3 we group these policy alternatives into three classes:
using communications policies to shape public expectations about the future
course of interest rates; increasing the size of the central bank’s balance
sheet; and changing the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet. 
We discuss how these policies might work, and we cite existing evidence 
on their utility from historical episodes and recent empirical research.
The paper’s main contribution is to provide new empirical evidence on
the possible effectiveness of these alternative policies. We employ two
basic approaches. First, we use event-study methods to examine ﬁnancial
market responses to central bank statements and announcements. By
using sufﬁciently narrow event windows, we can get precise estimates of
the market’s responses to central bank communications and to other types
of ﬁnancial or economic news. Second, we estimate no-arbitrage vector
autoregression (VAR) models of the term structure of interest rates for
both the United States and Japan.4 For any given set of macroeconomic
conditions and stance of monetary policy, these models permit us to pro-
ject the expected level and shape of the term structure. Using the pre-
dicted term structure as a benchmark, we are then able to assess whether
factors not included in the model—such as quantitative easing in Japan,
or changes in the relative supplies of Treasury securities during the recent
debt buyback episode in the United States—have economically signiﬁ-
cant effects on interest rates.
Our results provide some grounds for optimism about the likely efﬁ-
cacy of nonstandard policies. In particular, we conﬁrm a potentially
important role for central bank communications to shape public expecta-
tions of future policy actions. Our event studies for the United States con-
ﬁrm the result of Refet Gürkaynak, Brian Sack, and Eric Swanson that
surprises in the setting of the current policy rate are not sufﬁcient to
explain the effect of monetary policy decisions on policy expectations and
asset prices.5 These effects, however, can be explained by the addition of
a second factor that reﬂects revisions to private sector expectations about
the course of the policy rate over the subsequent year. Changes in the sec-
ond factor appear strongly linked to Federal Reserve policy statements,
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3. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004).
4. The VAR-based models we use are similar to that of Ang and Piazzesi (2003).
5. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004).
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to shape market expectations.
The U.S. record also provides encouraging evidence that changes in
the relative supplies of securities signiﬁcantly affect their relative returns.
As we know from the classic paper by William Brainard and James
Tobin,6 if assets are imperfect substitutes for each other, then changes in
the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet might be an effective
nonstandard policy. To assess this possibility, we apply the event-study
methodology to three important episodes in which U.S. ﬁnancial market
participants received information that led them to expect large changes in
the relative supplies of Treasury securities: the announcement of debt
buybacks following the emergence of budget surpluses in the late 1990s,
the massive foreign ofﬁcial purchases of U.S. Treasury securities over the
past two years, and the “deﬂation scare” of 2003, during which market
participants apparently believed that the Federal Reserve was seriously
considering a program of targeted bond purchases. We supplement the
event-study evidence with results from our estimated term structure
model, which provides a benchmark against which to compare the actual
behavior of Treasury yields during the above three episodes. Our evi-
dence generally supports the view that ﬁnancial assets are not perfect sub-
stitutes, implying that relative supplies do matter for asset pricing.
Our analysis of the recent Japanese experience focuses on two non-
standard policies recently employed by the Bank of Japan (BOJ). The ﬁrst
is the BOJ’s zero-interest-rate policy (ZIRP), under which the Japanese
central bank has committed to keeping its policy rate, the call rate, at zero
until deﬂation has been eliminated; the second is the BOJ’s quantitative
easing policy, which consists of providing bank reserves at levels much
greater than needed to maintain a policy rate of zero. Our evidence for the
effectiveness of these policies is more mixed than in the case of the
United States. In event-study analyses, which may be less informative in
Japan because of small sample sizes and our use of daily rather than intra-
day data, we ﬁnd no reliable relationship over the past few years between
one-year-ahead policy expectations and policy statements by the BOJ.
This result, taken on its own, suggests that the BOJ was either unwilling
or unable to inﬂuence one-year-ahead expectations during the period con-
sidered (but see below).
4 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
6. Brainard and Tobin (1968).
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vintage bearing on the second type of nonstandard policy, namely, chang-
ing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet (or quantitative easing).
Although the BOJ has used this strategy recently, many consider the man-
ner in which it has done so to have been relatively restrained and limited.
Moreover, other forces have no doubt been at work at the same time,
making it difﬁcult to parse out the effects of quantitative easing on the
economy. Nevertheless, our estimated term structure model for Japan
does suggest that yields in Japan were noticeably lower during the quanti-
tative easing period than the model would have predicted—a bit of evi-
dence for the effectiveness of this policy. A similar result emerges for the
period when the ZIRP was in effect, suggesting that the event-study
analysis may not have captured the full effect of the BOJ’s policy com-
mitments on longer-term yields.
Despite our relatively encouraging ﬁndings concerning the potential efﬁ-
cacy of nonstandard policies at the ZLB, we remain cautious about making
policy prescriptions. Although it appears that nonstandard policy measures
may affect asset yields and thus potentially the economy, considerable
uncertainty remains about the size and reliability of these effects under the
circumstances prevailing near the ZLB. Thus we still believe that the best
policy approach is one of avoidance, achieved by maintaining a sufﬁcient
inﬂation buffer and easing preemptively as necessary to minimize the risk
of hitting the ZLB. However, should that outcome prove unavoidable, we
hope that our research will provide some guidance on the potential of non-
standard policies to lift the economy away from the zero bound.
Monetary Policy Options at the Zero Bound
It is not without some irony that the resurgence in work on the ZLB,
which for a few generations of economists seemed to be a relic of the
Depression era, traces to a remarkable achievement by central banks in
the major industrial economies. Among those countries, annual consumer
price inﬂation has fallen to around 2 percent, about one-third the pace of
twenty years ago.
7 For instance, as shown in ﬁgure 1, the median inﬂation
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7. October of 2004 marked an important turning point in those efforts: Twenty-ﬁve
years ago, then–Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker and the other members of the Fed-
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United States.
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Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database has moved down
steadily since 1980.8 This disciplined pursuit of low inﬂation has no doubt
generated macroeconomic beneﬁts and should be considered a singular
accomplishment, but it also has been associated with episodes of very low
inﬂation and sometimes outright deﬂation.9 The minimum inﬂation rate
observed among these twenty-six economies has often been negative—
and consistently so over the past ten years. In the case of Japan, deﬂation
over the past ﬁve years implies that the current level of consumer prices is
now slightly lower than in 1995.
With inﬂation low and likely to remain so, industrial countries are at
risk of encountering the ZLB on nominal interest rates periodically in the
future. This raises the stakes for answering the question: What options
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
8. Data from Iceland and Israel, which both experienced bouts of very high inﬂation,
are excluded from the sample because they distort the maximums shown in the ﬁgure.
9. Key references on the potential beneﬁts and costs of low inﬂation include Friedman
(1969), Feldstein (1997), and Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996).
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rate, the usual response to a weak economy, is no longer possible? Many
previous studies have discussed possible answers to this question, and we
will not review this extensive literature in detail. Instead, as background
for the empirical results to be presented later, we provide an overview that
focuses on some key debates about the effectiveness of alternative non-
standard policies and describes existing empirical evidence bearing on
these debates.
Bernanke and Reinhart discuss three alternative, although potentially
complementary, strategies when monetary policymakers are confronted
with a short-term nominal interest rate that is close to zero.10 As discussed
in the introduction, these alternatives involve either shaping the expecta-
tions of the public about future settings of the policy rate; increasing the
size of the central bank’s balance sheet beyond the level needed to set the
short-term policy rate at zero (quantitative easing); or shifting the compo-
sition of the central bank’s balance sheet in order to affect the relative
supplies of securities held by the public. We use this taxonomy here as
well to organize our discussion of nonstandard policy options at or near
the ZLB.
Shaping Policy Expectations
Commentators often describe the stance of a central bank’s policy in
terms of the level of the short-term nominal interest rate. For example, the
very low short-term rates seen in Japan in recent years have led many to
refer to the BOJ’s monetary policy as “ultra-easy.”11 However, associat-
ing the stance of policy entirely with the level of the short-term nominal
interest rate can be seriously misleading. At a minimum, a distinction
needs to be drawn between the nominal short-term rate and the real short-
term rate; in a deﬂationary environment, a nominal interest rate near zero
does not preclude the possibility that real interest rates are too high for the
health of the economy.
A more subtle reason that the level of the policy rate does not fully
describe the stance of monetary policy is that a given policy rate may
coexist with widely varying conﬁgurations of asset prices and yields, and
hence with varying degrees of policy stimulus broadly considered. In the
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11. “BOJ Leaves Policy Unchanged, Keeps Ultra-Easy Stance,” Japan Policy and Pol-
itics, November 5, 2001.
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private sector borrowing and investment decisions. Rather, those deci-
sions respond most sensitively to longer-term yields (such as the yields on
mortgages and corporate bonds) and to the prices of long-lived assets
(such as housing and equities). A given short-term rate may thus be asso-
ciated with relatively restrictive ﬁnancial conditions (for example, if the
term structure is sharply upward sloping and equity prices are depressed)
or, alternatively, with relatively easy conditions (if the term structure is
ﬂat or downward sloping and equity prices are high). Indeed, copious
research by ﬁnancial economists has demonstrated that two and possibly
three factors (sometimes referred to as level, slope, and curvature) are
needed to describe the term structure of interest rates, implying that the
short-term policy rate alone can never be sufﬁcient to fully describe even
the term structure, let alone the broad range of ﬁnancial conditions.
Financial theory also tells us that the prices and yields of long-term
assets, which play such an important role in the transmission of monetary
policy, depend to a significant extent on financial market participants’
expectations about the future path of short-term rates. In particular, with
the relevant term, risk, and liquidity premiums held constant, expecta-
tions that short-term rates will be kept low will induce financial market
participants to bid down long-term bond yields and (for given expecta-
tions about future corporate earnings) bid up the prices of equities.
Because financial conditions depend on the expected future path of the
policy rate as well as (or even more than) its current value, central
bankers must be continuously aware of how their actions shape the pub-
lic’s policy expectations. The crucial role of expectations in the making
of monetary policy, in normal times as well as when the policy rate is
near the ZLB, has recently been stressed in two important papers by
Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford (EW).12 Indeed, in the context
of their theoretical model, EW obtain the strong result that shaping the
interest rate expectations of the public is essentially the only tool that
central bankers have—not only when the ZLB binds, but under normal
conditions as well. We will have several occasions to refer to the EW
result below and to suggest that the levers of policy are greater in number
than they contend.
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
12. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a, 2003b).
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EW, like most of the literature, emphasize the importance of the central
bank’s committing in advance to a policy rule. Under the assumption that
such a commitment is feasible, they focus on the problem of designing
policy rules that perform reasonably well both close to and away from the
ZLB. EW are surely correct that predictable, rule-like behavior on the part
of central banks is an important means of shaping the public’s policy
expectations. Central banks have generally become more predictable in
recent years, reﬂecting factors such as increased transparency and, in
some cases, the adoption of explicit policy frameworks such as inﬂation
targeting. However, there are limits in practice to the ability of central
banks to commit “once and for all” to a fully speciﬁed policy rule, as
envisioned by theoretical analyses of monetary policy under commitment.
Although a theoretician might be able to specify the appropriate state-
contingent policy plan for a given model, in practice a central bank would
likely ﬁnd it particularly difﬁcult to describe the details of its reactions to
highly unusual circumstances, such as those associated with the policy
rate being constrained by the ZLB.
Given that their ability to commit to precisely specified rules is lim-
ited, central bankers have found it useful in practice to supplement their
actions with talk, communicating regularly with the public about the out-
look for the economy and for policy. That is not to say that talk is an
independent instrument of policy, because statements by a central bank
will be believed by the public only if the central bank has a proven track
record of delivering on its stated commitments. However, if central
banks perceive a sufficient reputational cost to being seen to renege on
earlier statements, communication in advance may enhance the central
bank’s ability to commit to certain policies or courses of action. More-
over, at all times such communication can be helpful in achieving a
closer alignment between the policy expectations of the public and the
plans of the central bank.
Although communication is always important, its importance may be
elevated when the policy rate is constrained by the ZLB. In particular,
even with the overnight rate at zero, the central bank may be able to
impart additional stimulus to the economy by persuading the public that
the policy rate will remain low for a longer period than was previously
expected. One means of doing so would be to shade interest rate expecta-
tions downward by making a commitment to the public to follow a policy
Ben S. Bernanke, Vincent R. Reinhart, and Brian P. Sack 9
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ously expected, should lower longer-term rates, support other asset prices,
and boost aggregate demand.
In effect, public statements by the central bank may foster the expecta-
tion that it intends to follow what EW refer to as optimal monetary policy
under commitment rather than prematurely remove policy accommoda-
tion in the future (as happens in EW’s no-commitment case).13 The expec-
tation that the nominal short-term rate will be kept sufﬁciently low for
long enough to ward off deﬂation should also prevent inﬂation expecta-
tions from falling, which would otherwise raise real interest rates and
impose a drag on spending. Because interest rate commitments have
implications for inﬂation expectations in equilibrium, our description of
policy in terms of expected interest rate paths is closely related to the
types of policies analyzed by Paul Krugman and Lars Svensson.14 These
authors stress the importance of the central bank committing to generate
sufﬁcient future inﬂation to reduce the expected real interest rate to levels
supportive of aggregate spending. Our emphasis, as in EW, is on policies
under which the central bank commits to keeping the short-term nominal
rate low for long enough to achieve the same results.
Bernanke and Reinhart note that, in principle, such commitments
could be unconditional (that is, linked only to the calendar) or condi-
tional (linked to developments in the economy).15 Unconditional com-
mitments are rare. The Federal Reserve’s commitment to peg short-term
and long-term rates during the decade after 1942, discussed below, might
be considered an example of an unconditional commitment, in that the
pegging operation was open-ended and did not specify an exit strategy.
More usually, central bank commitments about future policies are
explicitly conditional.
An important recent example of a conditional commitment is the zero-
interest-rate policy of the Bank of Japan. The BOJ reduced the call rate to
a level “as low as possible”—to zero, for all practical purposes—in Feb-
ruary 1999. In April 1999 then-Governor of the BOJ Masaru Hayami
announced that the BOJ would keep the policy rate at zero “until defla-
10 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
13. Also see Reifschneider and Williams (2000) on the importance of committing to
keeping rates low.
14. Krugman (1998); Svensson (2001, 2003).
15. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004).
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ment was conditional.16 However, in a case of what might be called com-
mitment interruptus, the BOJ then raised the call rate to 25 basis points in
August 2000. In February 2001, following a subsequent weakening in
economic conditions, the rate increase was partly retracted. The ZIRP
was then effectively reinstated in March 2001, when the BOJ announced
that it would henceforth target bank reserves at a level well above that
needed to bring the call rate to zero (a policy of quantitative easing; see
below). Since that time the BOJ has attempted to assure the markets that
the reconstituted ZIRP, together with its other extraordinary policy mea-
sures, will be maintained as long as deflation persists. Indeed, under
Hayami’s successor as BOJ governor, Toshihiko Fukui, the BOJ has
become more explicit about the conditions required to move the call rate
from its zero floor, asserting that the ZIRP will not end until year-over-
year core inflation has been positive for several months and is expected
to remain positive.
A relevant, although less explicit, example of policy commitment is
also available for the United States. From the latter part of 2002 through
much of 2003, Federal Reserve ofﬁcials expressed concerns about what
they described as a “remote” possibility of deﬂation. Subsequently, in late
2003 and early 2004, although the deﬂation risk had receded, the slow
pace of job creation heightened concerns about the sustainability of the
economic recovery from the 2001 recession. Although the Federal Re-
serve’s policy rate remained at least 100 basis points above zero through-
out this period, policymakers became more speciﬁc in communicating
their outlook for policy in the attempt to shape expectations. For example,
the August 2003 statement of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC, the body responsible for the conduct of monetary policy in the
United States) that “policy accommodation can be maintained for a con-
siderable period” may be interpreted as an example of conditional com-
mitment.17 The conditional nature of the commitment was made clear in
the committee’s December 2003 policy statement, which explicitly linked
continuing policy accommodation to the low level of inﬂation and slack
in resource use. Likewise, the FOMC’s stated plan in 2004 to “remove
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17. The full texts of the FOMC’s statements can be found at www.federalreserve.
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market information about the likely direction of the policy rate but also
emphasized that future actions would be linked explicitly to the condition
that inﬂation remain under control.
Empirical evidence on the ability of central banks to influence policy
expectations through statements, speeches, and other forms of talk is rel-
atively limited. For the United States, Donald Kohn and Sack present evi-
dence that the issuance of FOMC statements increases the variability of
market interest rates on the day of the statement, suggesting that these
statements convey information to financial markets over and above the
information in any accompanying policy action.18 However, they do not
specifically address the ability of the FOMC to influence expectations of
future policy in the desired direction or at longer horizons. In the next
section we extend the work of Kohn and Sack to provide additional evi-
dence on the effects of FOMC statements on policy expectations and
asset prices.
More work has been done on the effects of the BOJ’s ZIRP, primarily
by researchers at the Bank of Japan and afﬁliated research institutions.
The majority of this research suggests that the ZIRP has been successful
at affecting policy expectations, and thus at affecting yields, although the
greatest impact is observed at the short end of the maturity spectrum.19
Also, studies that include both the early ZIRP period, before August
2000, and the later application of the policy, which commenced in March
2001 with the introduction of the quantitative easing policy, tend to ﬁnd
modestly stronger effects in the latter period.20 In an interesting paper,
Kohei Marumo and others use an estimated model of the Japanese term
structure to back out the evolution of market participants’ beliefs about
how long the ZIRP would hold.21 They ﬁnd that, over the period from
February 1999 to August 2000, the mode of the probability distribution
over the expected remaining time of the policy ranged from less than one
year to about three years. For the second incarnation of the ZIRP, after
March 2001, they ﬁnd that modal expectations of the time to the end of
12 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
18. Kohn and Sack (2003).
19. Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002); Takeda and Yajima (2002); Okina and Shiratsuka
(2004).
20. Nagayasu (2004).
21. Marumo and others (2003).
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Shigenori Shiratsuka obtained similar results, ultimately concluding that
“[t]he policy duration effect was highly effective in stabilizing market
expectations regarding the future path of short-term interest rates, thereby
bringing longer-term interest rates down to ﬂatten the yield curve.”22
A shortcoming shared by most of these studies, however, is the
absence of an adequate benchmark for the term structure. That is, most
existing studies do not effectively answer the question of what yields
would have been in the absence of the ZIRP. Hence we really do not know
(for example) whether the exceedingly low level of longer-term govern-
ment bond yields in Japan during recent years primarily reﬂects expecta-
tions of low future policy rates or the belief that Japan faces a protracted
period of deﬂation. In an interesting recent paper, Naohiko Baba and oth-
ers address the benchmark issue by estimating a “macro-ﬁnance,” no-
arbitrage model of the term structure (discussed in more detail in the next
section).23 They use this model to estimate what yields in Japan would
have been at each date, given the state of the economy, under the counter-
factual assumption that no ZIRP was in place. A comparison of the actual
term structure with the estimated benchmark permits inferences about the
effects of the ZIRP. Notably, these authors ﬁnd somewhat stronger net
effects of the ZIRP on long-term yields than does much of the earlier
work. We apply a similar strategy in our empirical analysis below.
Our discussion, like much of the literature, has focused on regimes in
which the short-term nominal interest rate is the instrument of monetary
policy. However, other variables can and have served as a nominal anchor
for the system and thus as a target or instrument for the central bank.
Svensson has called attention to the nominal exchange rate as an alter-
native policy instrument when the ZLB binds, noting that monetary poli-
cies that can be defined in terms of current and future values of the
short-term nominal interest rate can equally well be expressed in terms
of paths for the nominal exchange rate.24 Switching the policy instrument
from the short-term interest rate to the exchange rate does not eliminate
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23. Baba and others (2004).
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exchange rate cannot be engineered by the central bank, because the val-
ues of the short-term nominal interest rate implied by interest rate parity
would violate the ZLB. Nevertheless, we agree with Svensson that com-
mitments by the central bank to future policies may be more credible
when expressed in terms of a planned path for the exchange rate rather
than in terms of future values of the short-term nominal interest rate. One
obvious beneﬁt of expressing policy commitments in terms of the
exchange rate is that such a commitment is veriﬁable, in that the central
bank’s announcement can be accompanied by an immediate and visible
change in the exchange rate; promises about future values of the short-
term interest rate cannot be accompanied by immediate action, if the cur-
rent policy rate is at the ZLB.25
These considerations suggest that exchange rate–based policies may be
the best way for smaller open economies to break the hold of the ZLB.
For example, the Swiss National Bank increased its use of the exchange
rate as a policy indicator during its recent struggle with the ZLB. Whether
large economies like the United States or Japan can have success with ex-
change rate–based policies is more controversial. Skeptics have argued
that the strongest short-term effects of the devaluation suggested by Svensson
would be felt on the patterns of trade, raising the possibility that the large
country’s trading partners would accuse it of following a beggar-thy-
neighbor policy. Svensson has replied that growth in domestic demand
would ultimately raise imports, offsetting the terms-of-trade effects cre-
ated by the devaluation. Whether these second-round effects would develop
quickly enough to help defuse the political problem, however, is difﬁcult
to judge, and we have nothing to add to this controversy. Because large in-
dustrial countries have traditionally emphasized interest rates and money
growth as policy instruments, the remainder of the paper focuses on these
variables. That said, we believe that empirical study of the use of the ex-
change rate as a policy indicator when the ZLB is binding would be highly
worthwhile.
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veriﬁable by announcing a desired range for an intermediate- or longer-term yield, perhaps
in conjunction with central bank purchases in the corresponding segment of the market, a
question we discuss below. Up to now the literature has tended to focus on the exchange
rate, not a note or bond price, as the intermediate policy target.
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(Quantitative Easing)
Central banks normally lower their policy rate through open-market
purchases of bonds or other securities, which have the effect of increasing
the supply of bank reserves and putting downward pressure on the rate
that clears the reserves market. A sufﬁcient injection of reserves will
bring the policy rate arbitrarily close to zero, so that the ZLB rules out fur-
ther interest rate reduction. However, nothing prevents the central bank
from adding liquidity to the system beyond what is needed to achieve a
policy rate of zero, in a policy known as quantitative easing. As already
noted, Japan has actively pursued this policy approach in recent years.
Announced in March 2001, the BOJ’s quantitative easing policy might
initially have been interpreted as a recommitment to the policy of keeping
the short-term rate at zero—that is, of maintaining the ZIRP. However,
the BOJ raised its target for current account balances at commercial banks
(essentially, bank reserves) a number of times, to the point that reserves
substantially exceeded the level needed to pin the call rate at zero. (The
BOJ’s target for current account balances reached 30-35 trillion yen in
January 2004, compared with required reserves of approximately 6 tril-
lion yen, and the monetary base grew by two-thirds in the three years fol-
lowing the initiation of the quantitative easing policy.)26 However, as has
been frequently noted, growth in bank reserves and base money in Japan
has not resulted in comparable growth in broader monetary aggregates. In
large part this limited effect stems from the poor condition of banks’ and
borrowers’ balance sheets, which makes proﬁtable lending difﬁcult and
induces banks to hold large quantities of idle balances.
Whether quantitative easing can be effective in relieving deﬂationary
pressures and, if so, by what mechanism, remains controversial. As already
noted, EW have provided theoretical reasons to doubt the efﬁcacy of quan-
titative easing as an independent tool of policy. They show that, in a world
in which ﬁnancial frictions are sufﬁciently minimal to permit full insurance
against idiosyncratic consumption risks, and in which effects of monetary
policy on the government’s budget constraint are ruled out, quantitative
easing will have no effect, except perhaps to the extent that the extra money
creation can be used to signal the central bank’s intentions regarding future
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kets are essentially frictionless and that ﬁscal budget constraints are inde-
pendent of monetary policy are rather strong. If these assumptions do not
hold, we may have some basis for believing that quantitative easing will
be effective.
Why might injections of liquidity that go beyond the point necessary to
drive the short-term policy rate to zero help the economy? One argument
for quantitative easing is what might be called the reduced-form argu-
ment. Broadly, those making this argument are agnostic about the precise
mechanisms by which quantitative easing may have its effects. Instead, in
support of quantitative easing as an anti-deﬂationary tool, they point to
the undeniable fact that, historically, money growth and inﬂation have
tended to be strongly associated. It follows, according to this argument,
that money creation will raise prices independent of its effects on the term
structure.
Basing policy recommendations on reduced-form evidence of this sort
is problematic, however. As the Lucas critique warns us, historical rela-
tionships are prone to break down in novel circumstances. In particular,
there is no reason to expect the velocity of money to be stable or pre-
dictable when the short-term interest rate (the opportunity cost of holding
money) is close to zero, and thus no reason to expect a stable relationship
between money growth and nominal income under those conditions. To
make the case for quantitative easing, we need more explicit descriptions
of how additional money growth might stimulate the economy even when
the short-term interest rate has reached zero.
At least three channels through which quantitative easing may be
effective have been advanced. The ﬁrst builds from the premise that
money and other ﬁnancial assets are imperfect substitutes.27 According to
this view, open-market purchases of securities will raise the amount of
money relative to nonmoney assets in the public’s portfolio. The private
sector’s collective attempt to rebalance portfolios will tend to raise the
prices and lower the yields of nonmoney assets if money and nonmoney
assets are imperfect substitutes. Higher asset values and lower yields, in
turn, stimulate the economy, according to this view. Recently, Javier
Andres, David Lopez-Salido, and Edward Nelson have shown how these
16 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
27. This view is associated both with monetarist expositions, such as Meltzer (2001),
and with Keynesian classics, such as Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969).
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ﬁnancial market frictions.28
So long as technology has not made it possible to pay a grocery bill
with a stock certiﬁcate or the deed to a home, it is difﬁcult to dispute the
premise that, as a general matter, money and nonmoney assets are imper-
fect substitutes. However, in the special situation of a binding ZLB, large
additional injections of liquidity may satiate the public’s demand for
money, implying that, at the margin, extra cash provides no transactions
services to households or ﬁrms. If money demand is satiated, money
becomes (at the margin) just another ﬁnancial asset, one that happens to
pay a zero nominal rate, to be riskless in nominal terms, and to have an
indeﬁnite maturity. In this situation it is no longer obvious that money is a
particularly poor substitute for nonmonetary assets. For example, with the
important exception of its maturity, money’s characteristics are very
close to those of short-term Treasury bills paying close to zero interest.
Of course, even in this situation there will be assets—real estate, for
example—that are not very substitutable with money, implying that the
central bank’s choice of assets to buy may matter a great deal.
A second possible mechanism for quantitative easing to inﬂuence the
economy is the ﬁscal channel. This channel relies on the observation that
sufﬁciently large monetary injections will materially relieve the govern-
ment’s budget constraint, permitting tax reductions or increases in govern-
ment spending without increasing public holdings of government debt.29
Effectively, the ﬁscal channel is based on the government’s substitution
of seigniorage (a tax with little or no deadweight loss in a deﬂationary
environment) for direct taxes such as income taxes. Alan Auerbach and
Maurice Obstfeld provide a detailed analysis of both the macroeconomic
and the welfare effects of the ﬁscal channel and ﬁnd that they are poten-
tially quite substantial.30 These authors also note, however, that the ﬁscal
effect of quantitative easing will be attenuated or absent if the public ex-
pects today’s monetary injections to be withdrawn in the future.31 Broadly,
if the public expects quantitative easing to be reversed at the ﬁrst sign that
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31. Their point is closely related to Krugman’s (1998) important analysis, which
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tax cuts will be replaced by future tax increases as money is withdrawn,
and this expectation will blunt the initial impact of the policy. Thus it is
crucial that the central bank’s promises to maintain some part of its quan-
titative easing as the economy recovers be perceived by the public as
credible. Auerbach and Obstfeld show that, if the central bank is known
to be willing to tolerate even a very small amount of inflation, the
promise to maintain quantitative easing will be credible. A similar result
would likely obtain if the central bank associates even a relatively small
cost with publicly reneging on its promises. Thus it seems reasonable to
expect that the ﬁscal channel of quantitative easing would work if pursued
sufﬁciently aggressively.
A third potential mechanism of quantitative easing, admittedly harder
to pin down than others, might be called the signaling channel. Simply
put, quantitative easing may complement the expectations management
approach by providing a visible signal to the public about the central
bank’s intended future policies. For example, if the public believes that
the central bank will be hesitant to reverse large amounts of quantitative
easing very quickly, perhaps because of the possible shock to money mar-
kets, this policy provides a way of underscoring the central bank’s com-
mitment to keeping the policy rate at zero for an extended period.
More speculatively, quantitative easing may work through a signaling
channel if its implementation marks a general willingness of the central
bank to break from the cautious and conventional policies of the past. A
historical episode that may illustrate this channel at work (although the
policymaker in question was the executive rather than the central bank)
was the period following Franklin D. Roosevelt’s inauguration as U.S.
president in 1933. During 1933 and 1934 the extreme deﬂation seen ear-
lier in the decade suddenly reversed, stock prices jumped, and the econ-
omy grew rapidly. Christina Romer has argued persuasively that this
surprisingly sharp recovery was closely associated with the rapid growth
in the money supply that arose from Roosevelt’s devaluation of the dollar,
capital inﬂows from an increasingly unstable Europe, and other factors.32
Because short-term interest rates remained near zero throughout the period,
the episode is reasonably characterized as a successful application of quan-
titative easing. Romer does not explain the mechanism by which quantita-
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rates declined as deﬂation changed to inﬂation.33 Peter Temin and Barrie
Wigmore addressed that question, arguing that the key to the sudden
reversal was the public’s acceptance of the idea that Roosevelt’s policies
constituted a “regime change.”34 The policymakers who preceded him had
shown little inclination to resist deﬂation and, indeed, seemed to prefer
deﬂation to even a small probability of future inﬂation. In contrast, Roo-
sevelt demonstrated clearly through his actions that he was committed to
ending deﬂation and reﬂating the economy. Although the president could
have simply announced his desire to raise prices, his adoption of policies
that his predecessors would have considered reckless provided a powerful
signal to the public that the economic situation had fundamentally
changed. If one accepts the Temin-Wigmore hypothesis, it appears that
the signal afforded by Roosevelt’s exchange rate and monetary policies
was central to the conquest of deﬂation in 1933–34.35
Outside of the suggestive evidence from the interwar period just dis-
cussed, there has been little empirical analysis of the quantitative easing
channel. The only recent experience to draw upon, of course, is that of
Japan since March 2001. Masaaki Shirakawa reviewed the quantitative
easing policy after one year and argued that, although the policy may be
credited with reducing liquidity premiums in some markets, it did not
have discernible effects on the prices of most assets, including govern-
ment bonds, equities, or foreign currency, nor did it increase bank lend-
ing.36 Takeshi Kimura and others studied the effects of quantitative easing
by vector autoregression methods and by estimating a money demand
equation. They concluded that any effects of quantitative easing have
been very small and highly uncertain.37
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33. Dollar devaluation, of course, improved the competitiveness of U.S. exports and
raised the prices of imports. But, in an economy that was by this time largely closed, the
direct effects of devaluation seem unlikely to have been large enough to account for the
sharp turnaround. Eichengreen (1992) argues persuasively that the devaluation stimulated
the economy by freeing up the money supply rather than by changing relative prices.
34. Temin and Wigmore (1990).
35. Meltzer (1999) has also drawn on the experience of the ﬁrst half of the twentieth
century, including episodes in 1920–21, 1937–38, and 1947–48, to argue for the potential
beneﬁts of quantitative easing.
36. Shirakawa (2002).
37. Kimura and others (2002).
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there are, of course, a bit of evidence in favor of the effectiveness of the
BOJ’s quantitative easing policy. Unfortunately, however, they are far
from decisive. Other factors have certainly played a role in the recent
improvement in the Japanese economy, including structural and banking
reforms, a strengthening world economy, and the ZIRP. The quantitative
easing policy, although an important departure from the standard policy
framework, has in fact been somewhat conservative in its execution.
Despite some interesting initiatives intended to promote the development
of various ﬁnancial markets, the BOJ has largely restricted its open-
market purchases to the usual suspects—government securities—thereby
inhibiting any effect that might work through imperfect substitutability.
Even more important, there has been a notable absence of cooperation
between the monetary and the ﬁscal authorities (indeed, the BOJ has
expressed repeated concerns that monetary ease might facilitate ﬁscal
indiscipline), and the communication and signaling aspects of policy have
been subdued. We will present some evidence that is consistent with
quantitative easing having been effective in Japan, but our ﬁndings do not
clearly isolate the effects of quantitative easing from other inﬂuences. The
reality may well be that the Japanese experience does not support strong
conclusions about the potential efﬁcacy of this particular nonstandard
policy.
Altering the Composition of the Central Bank’s Balance Sheet
The composition of the assets on the central bank’s balance sheet
offers another potential lever for monetary policy. For example, the
Federal Reserve participates in all segments of the Treasury market,
including inflation-indexed Treasury debt: its asset holdings of about
$700 billion are distributed among Treasury securities with original
maturities ranging from four weeks to thirty years. Over the past fifty
years, the average maturity of the Federal Reserve System’s holdings of
Treasury debt has varied considerably within a range from one to four
years. By buying and selling securities of various maturities or other
characteristics in the open market, the Federal Reserve could materially
influence the relative supplies of these securities. In a frictionless finan-
cial market, as EW point out, these changes in supply would have essen-
tially no effect, because the pricing of any financial asset would depend
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world with transactions costs and in which financial markets are incom-
plete in important ways, the Federal Reserve’s action might be able to
influence term, risk, and liquidity premiums—and thus overall yields.38
The feasibility of this approach is, of course, closely related to the issue
of whether different types of assets are imperfect substitutes for each
other, as discussed earlier.
The same logic would apply, of course, to other ﬁnancial and real assets
that the central bank might buy or sell. Except under certain emergency
provisions dormant since the 1930s, however, the Federal Reserve is
restricted to purchasing a limited range of assets outside of Treasury secu-
rities, including some foreign government bonds, the debt of government-
sponsored enterprises, and some municipal securities.39 Various methods
might effectively make these restrictions less binding. For example, the
Federal Reserve has the authority to accept a wide range of assets as col-
lateral for loans from its discount window. Some other central banks face
fewer restrictions on the assets they can hold; for example, the BOJ’s
expansionary efforts have involved purchases not only of treasury bills
and Japanese government bonds, but also of commercial paper, various
asset-backed securities, and equities (from commercial banks).
Perhaps the most extreme example of a policy keyed to the composi-
tion of the central bank’s balance sheet is the announcement of a ceiling
on some longer-term yield that is below the rate then prevailing in the
market. Such a policy would entail an essentially unlimited commitment
to purchase the targeted security at the announced price. If these pur-
chases were allowed to affect the size of the central bank’s balance sheet
as well as its composition, ultimately the policy might also involve quan-
titative easing. A “pure” pegging policy would require the central bank to
sell other securities equal in amount to its purchases of the targeted secu-
rity. A commitment to peg a longer-term yield may also help to convince
the public that the central bank intends to keep the short-term rate low for
a considerable period; such a policy would thus include an element of
expectations shaping as well.
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38. In carrying out such a policy, the Federal Reserve would need to coordinate with
the Treasury, to ensure that the latter’s debt issuance policies did not offset the former’s
actions. In principle, the Treasury could alter its debt management patterns to achieve the
same effect, much along the lines discussed by Tobin (1963).
39. Clouse and others (2003) review the Federal Reserve’s legal authority.
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the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet can have signiﬁcant
effects is a contentious issue. A fair characterization of the prevailing
view among ﬁnancial economists is that changes in the relative supplies
of assets within the range of U.S. experience are unlikely to have a major
impact on these premiums and thus on overall yields.40 We will present
new evidence on this issue later in the paper. If the view is correct that
financial pricing approximates the frictionless ideal, then attempts to
enforce a ceiling on the yields of long-term Treasury securities would
be successful only if the targeted yields were broadly consistent with
investor expectations about future values of the policy rate. If investors
doubted that rates would be kept low, this view would predict that the
central bank would end up owning all or most of the targeted security.
Moreover, even if large purchases of, say, a long-dated Treasury secu-
rity were able to affect the yield on that security, the yield on that secu-
rity might become “disconnected” from the rest of the Treasury term
structure and from rates on private sector securities, thus reducing the
economic impact of the policy.
Such caveats notwithstanding, history offers a number of examples of
rate pegs by central banks. During the twentieth century, central banks in
a number of countries successfully pegged (or imposed a ceiling on)
long-term government bond rates in order to facilitate the financing of
war or postwar reconstruction. In the United States, the Federal Reserve
maintained ceilings on Treasury yields at seven different maturities
between 1942 and the 1951 Accord; among these were caps of 
3⁄8 percent
on ninety-day Treasury bill rates (raised to 
3⁄4 percent in July 1947) and of
2
1⁄2 percent on very long term bonds. The peg on bills appeared to be
binding, in that for most of the period the rate on bills remained precisely
at the announced level, and Federal Reserve holdings of bills grew
steadily, exceeding 90 percent of the outstanding stock by 1947.41 In con-
trast, the 2
1⁄2 percent cap on very long term bond yields was maintained
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40. Reinhart and Sack (2000) show that a simple mean-variance model of portfolio
choice predicts that even sizable changes in the composition of the public’s asset holdings
would have only small effects on yields. However, a number of studies, including Roley
(1982) and Friedman and Kuttner (1998), have provided evidence of imperfect substitution
among broad asset classes.
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that the cap was not a binding constraint. There were exceptions to this
generalization, however: Notably, from the beginning of the regime in
April 1942 through December 1944, long-term bond yields fluctuated in
a narrow range between 2.43 percent and 2.50 percent, suggesting that
the cap had some influence.42 Also, between October 1947 and Decem-
ber 1948, the Federal Reserve appears to have intervened actively to keep
bond yields just below the peg, in the process raising the central bank’s
holdings of bonds from near zero to about 13 percent of the outstanding
stock.43
The relative ease with which the Federal Reserve maintained the ceil-
ing on long-term government bond yields for an entire decade raises
intriguing questions. During the early part of the pegging period, memo-
ries of the low interest rates of the 1930s and ongoing low inﬂation
(enforced in part by wartime price controls) plausibly implied equilibrium
long-term yields either below or not far above the ceiling. After the war
and the elimination of wartime controls, however, inﬂation rose quite
sharply. Yet the long-term peg remained intact. Barry Eichengreen and
Peter Garber argue that the public was conﬁdent that the Federal Reserve
would reverse the postwar inﬂation and hence remained content to hold
low-yielding bonds.44 Likewise, Mark Toma notes that there is no logical
inconsistency in promising a monetary policy that is easy in the short run
but anti-inﬂationary in the long run, as the pegging policy seemed to do.45
In this paper we focus our empirical analysis on more recent episodes, and
so we conﬁne ourselves here to raising a few questions about the pre-
Accord period that we believe merit further analysis. First, if we accept
the Eichengreen-Garber argument that long-term inﬂation expectations
were well behaved during this period, we might still ask how, if at all, the
Federal Reserve’s pegging policy inﬂuenced those expectations. For
example, did the pegging policy communicate a commitment to low inﬂa-
tion, perhaps because the public understood that the Federal Reserve
would do all it could to avert the capital losses to banks and on its own
account that would be suffered if inﬂation and long-term rates rose
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ple by reducing the perceived risk in holding long-term bonds? Finally,
did the Federal Reserve in fact succeed in pegging long-term yields below
their equilibrium levels in 1942–44 and 1947–48, and, if so, what were
the consequences?
A second well-known historical episode involving the attempted
manipulation of the term structure was the so-called Operation Twist.
Launched in early 1961 by the incoming Kennedy administration, Opera-
tion Twist was intended to raise short-term rates (thereby promoting cap-
ital inﬂows and supporting the dollar) while lowering, or at least not
raising, long-term rates.46 The two main actions underlying Operation
Twist were, ﬁrst, the use of Federal Reserve open-market operations and
Treasury debt management operations to shorten the average maturity of
government debt held by the public, and second, some easing of the inter-
est rate restrictions on deposits imposed by Regulation Q. The current
view, shaped largely by the classic work by Franco Modigliani and
Richard Sutch,47 is that Operation Twist was a failure.48 Their empirical
estimates of the “habitat model” of interest rate determination led them to
conclude that Operation Twist narrowed the spread between long-term
and short-term yields by amounts that “are most unlikely to exceed some
ten to twenty base points—a reduction that can be considered moderate at
best.”49 However, Modigliani and Sutch also noted that Operation Twist
was a relatively small operation and, indeed, that over a slightly longer
period the maturity of outstanding government debt rose signiﬁcantly,
rather than fell.50 Thus Operation Twist does not seem to provide strong
evidence in either direction as to the possible effects of changes in the
composition of the central bank’s balance sheet. In the next section we
consider the effects of more signiﬁcant changes in relative supplies of
government bonds of different maturities than were observed during
Operation Twist.
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46. Modigliani and Sutch (1966).
47. Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967).
48. The Modigliani-Sutch conclusion was not uncontroversial; see, for example, Hol-
land (1969).
49. Modigliani and Sutch (1966, p. 196)
50. This was also noted by Tobin (1974).
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Evidence from the United States
Although the federal funds rate declined to 1 percent in 2003, short-
term nominal interest rates in the United States have not been effectively
constrained by the ZLB since the 1930s. Nevertheless, the recent experi-
ence of the United States provides some opportunities to test the potential
effectiveness of nonstandard monetary policies in a modern, ﬁnancially
sophisticated economy.
The previous section classiﬁed nonstandard monetary policies under
three headings: using communications to shape policy expectations;
increasing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet beyond what is
needed to bring short-term rates to zero (quantitative easing); and chang-
ing the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet in order to affect
the relative supplies, and thus possibly the relative prices, of targeted
securities. As far as we can see, the recent experience of the United States
does not contain any episodes useful for studying the potential of the sec-
ond type of nonstandard policy. However, as we discuss in this section,
recent U.S. experience does provide valuable evidence, both direct and
indirect, on the effectiveness of the ﬁrst and third types.
We ﬁrst address the question of whether the recent communication poli-
cies of the Federal Open Market Committee have inﬂuenced market ex-
pectations of future short-term interest rates, as would be required to affect
longer-term rates by shaping market expectations (the ﬁrst class of nonstan-
dard policies). Our principal methodology is event-study analysis; that is,
we draw inferences about the impact of FOMC statements from the behav-
ior of market-based indicators of policy expectations in a narrow window
surrounding FOMC announcements. We also use the event-study approach
to determine whether FOMC statements affect the responsiveness of policy
expectations to other types of news, such as employment reports. The
event-study analysis shows that FOMC policy statements do in fact have a
substantial impact on market expectations of future policy, both directly
and indirectly, suggesting that the committee does have some scope to use
communication policies to inﬂuence the yields and prices of longer-term
assets. To assess further the magnitude of these effects, we next estimate a
macroﬁnance model of the term structure of Treasury yields, which links
the term structure to macroeconomic conditions and to indicators of mone-
tary policy. Comparison of this benchmark model of the term structure with
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tude and duration of the effects of FOMC “talk” on the term structure.
In the second part of this section, we present evidence that bears on the
possibility that changes in the composition of the Federal Reserve’s bal-
ance sheet might influence asset prices—the third type of nonstandard
policy. The key issue here is whether changes in the relative supplies of
assets, such as government bonds of different maturities, have signiﬁcant
effects on prices and yields, holding macroeconomic conditions and policy
interest rates constant. We address this issue indirectly by considering the
market effects of three recent episodes: ﬁrst, the period of Treasury debt
buybacks of the late 1990s, during which the Treasury announced its inten-
tion to shorten signiﬁcantly the maturity structure of U.S. debt; second, the
large purchases of U.S. Treasuries by Japan’s Ministry of Finance during
the period of Japan’s exchange rate interventions after 1998; and third, the
“deﬂation scare” episode of 2003, during which bond market participants
purportedly saw a signiﬁcant probability that the Federal Reserve might
use securities purchases to try to affect longer-term yields. Using the same
two methodologies as applied in the study of FOMC statements—that is,
an event-study approach and the use of an estimated model of the term
structure as a benchmark for comparison—we ﬁnd evidence that “supply
effects” have at times signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced bond yields, suggesting that
targeted purchases of bonds at the ZLB could be effective at lowering the
yields on longer-dated securities. However, the duration and magnitude of
these effects remain somewhat unclear from our analysis.
Do FOMC Statements Inﬂuence Policy Expectations?
Has the FOMC historically exerted any inﬂuence on investors’ expec-
tations about the future course of policy? Although members of the
FOMC communicate to the public through a variety of channels, includ-
ing speeches and congressional testimony, ofﬁcial communications from
the FOMC as an ofﬁcial body (ex cathedra, one might say) are conﬁned
principally to the statements that the FOMC releases with its policy deci-
sions.51 In this section we investigate whether FOMC statements have
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icy changes themselves. We undertake a similar exercise for the Bank of
Japan later in the paper.
The FOMC has moved signiﬁcantly in the direction of greater trans-
parency over the past decade. Before 1994, no policy statements or
descriptions of the target for the federal funds rate were released after
FOMC meetings. Instead, except when changes in the federal funds rate
coincided with changes in the discount rate (which were announced by a
press release of the Federal Reserve Board), the FOMC signaled its policy
decisions to the ﬁnancial markets only indirectly, through open-market
operations, typically on the day following the policy decision. In February
1994 the FOMC began to release statements noting changes in its target
for the federal funds rate, but it continued to remain silent following
meetings where no policy changes occurred. Since May 1999, however,
the committee has released a statement after every policy meeting.
The FOMC statements have evolved considerably. In their most recent
form they brieﬂy describe the current state of the economy and, in some
cases, provide some hints about the near-term outlook for policy. They
also contain a formulaic description of the so-called balance of risks with
respect to the outlook for output growth and inﬂation. A consecutive read-
ing of the statements reveals continual tinkering by the committee to
improve its communications. For example, the balance-of-risks portion of
the statement replaced an earlier formulation, the “policy tilt,” which
characterized the likely future direction of the federal funds rate. Much
like the policy tilt statement, the balance-of-risks statement hints about
the likely evolution of policy, but it does so more indirectly by focusing
on the committee’s assessment of the potential risks to its dual objectives
rather than on the policy rate. The relative weights of forward-looking
and backward-looking characterizations of the data and of policy have
also changed over time, with the FOMC taking a relatively more forward-
looking stance in 2003 and 2004.
Of course, investors read the statements carefully to try to divine the
FOMC’s views on the economy and its policy inclinations.52 This careful
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what it does, matters for asset pricing. Here we support this observation
with more formal evidence and try to judge the magnitude of the effect.
To measure the inﬂuence of these FOMC announcements, we ﬁrst take
an event-study approach. We look at the movements in three market-
based indicators of the private sector’s monetary policy expectations dur-
ing the periods surrounding FOMC decisions—including both decisions
made at scheduled FOMC meetings and decisions made between regular
meetings—since July 1991.53 The ﬁrst of the three indicators is a now-
standard measure of the surprise component of current policy decisions.
This measure, derived from the current-month federal funds futures con-
tract in the manner described by Kenneth Kuttner,54 provides a market-
based estimate of the difference between the federal funds rate target set
by the FOMC and the value of the funds rate target that market partici-
pants expected just before the FOMC’s announcement. (Essentially, the
change in the near-term federal funds contract in response to the decision,
when scaled by the number of days remaining in that month-long con-
tract, provides a measure of the change in expectations.) The second
indicator is the rate on the Eurodollar futures contract expiring about a
year ahead. Roughly speaking, the change in this rate during the period
that spans the announcement of the FOMC’s decision is a measure of the
change in year-ahead policy expectations (and movements in the term
premium associated with those changes) induced by the committee’s
decisions. Finally, we also consider changes in the yield on Treasury
securities of ﬁve years’ maturity, which provide an indication of changes
in market expectations of policy (as well as associated changes in term
premiums) at a ﬁve-year horizon. To isolate the effects of policy events
on these indicators as cleanly as possible, we focus on movements in 
the three market-based indicators over the one-hour window (from fif-
teen minutes before to forty-five minutes after) surrounding the policy
announcements.
We would like to test whether the private sector’s policy expectations
over the hour surrounding an FOMC announcement are affected solely by
28 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
53. Determining precisely when each decision was conveyed or signaled to the markets
is a tedious process. See the text and especially the appendix of Gürkaynak, Sack, and
Swanson (2004) for a discussion and a detailed listing of the timing of decisions.
54. Kuttner (2001).
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room for additional inﬂuences on expectations arising from the commit-
tee’s statement. The earlier literature has mostly considered the effects on
asset prices and yields of the current policy surprise only.55 If the “one-
factor” view of the effects of FOMC decisions implicit in these studies is
correct, there can be no independent effect of the committee’s statements
on policy expectations or asset prices. To investigate this issue, we follow
an approach similar to that of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson to deter-
mine whether signiﬁcant factors independent of the current policy sur-
prise are needed to account for the response of policy expectations at the
one-year and ﬁve-year horizons.56 Speciﬁcally, we construct a candidate
set of factors through a Cholesky decomposition of our three indicators of
changes in policy expectations. We assume that the ﬁrst factor equals the
current policy surprise, as inferred from the federal funds futures market,
which also affects the year-ahead futures rate and the ﬁve-year yield. The
second candidate factor equals the portion of the change in year-ahead
policy expectations (as measured by the change in the Eurodollar futures
contract) not explained by (that is, orthogonal to) the ﬁrst factor, which is
also allowed to inﬂuence the ﬁve-year yield. As a residual, the third can-
didate factor is the change in the ﬁve-year Treasury yield not explained by
(orthogonal to) the ﬁrst two factors. If the one-factor view of the effects of
policy decisions is correct, then the second and third candidate factors
should account for only a small portion of the changes in longer-horizon
interest rates in the period surrounding FOMC decisions, and they should
be unrelated to aspects of the FOMC decision (such as the statement)
other than the change in the policy rate.
The loadings of the three market indicators of policy expectations on
the three factors, as determined by the Cholesky decomposition, are shown
in the top panel of table 1. By construction, each of the diagonal elements
of the table is equal to unity. As already mentioned, the ﬁrst factor has
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55. Kuttner (2001); Bernanke and Kuttner (forthcoming).
56. Our analysis extends the work of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004) in two
ways. First, we analyze the relationship of the policy factors to FOMC statements in greater
detail. Second, as discussed later in the paper, we extend the analysis to the case of Japan.
Methodologically, our approach also differs from theirs in some respects. In particular,
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson use four futures contracts covering policy expectations out
to a year; we use only one contract to measure year-ahead expectations but use a longer-
term yield as well. In addition, we use different methods than Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
to identify the underlying factors.
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measured by the method of Kuttner.57 Note that the second and third ele-
ments of the ﬁrst column show the effect of a one-unit increase in the cur-
rent policy surprise on policy expectations one year and ﬁve years ahead,
respectively. As found by Kuttner, the effects of a current policy surprise
on yields diminish as the horizon lengthens. The second factor has (again,
by design) a unitary effect on year-ahead policy expectations and a dimin-
ishing effect on the ﬁve-year yield, whereas the third factor (by design)
affects only the ﬁve-year yield.
An important finding is that the second factor (defined, again, as the
part of the change in the year-ahead rate that is orthogonal to the surprise
in the federal funds rate) plays a substantial role in determining policy
expectations. This point can be seen in the bottom panel of table 1, which
reports the standard deviation of the effect of each factor on the three
market indicators of expectations in the period since 1998.58 The standard
deviation of the component of the year-ahead futures rate accounted for
by the second factor (10.1) is twice that of the component accounted for
by the first factor (5.1). Putting the results in terms of variances, we can
infer from the bottom panel of table 1 that only about one-fifth of the
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57. Kuttner (2001).
58. The post-April 1998 subsample in the bottom panel of table 1 is chosen for compa-
rability to the results presented below for the Bank of Japan. The results reported in the
table are similar if the full sample is used.
Table 1. Factor Decomposition of Monetary Policy Indicators, United Statesa
Effect or standard deviation Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Loading of factor onb
Current policy setting 1.00 0.00 0.00
Year-ahead futures rate 0.51 1.00 0.00
Five-year yield 0.27 0.64 1.00
Standard deviation of effect of factor onc
Current policy setting 10.0 0 0
Year-ahead futures rate 5.1 10.1 0
Five-year yield 2.7 6.5 3.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and GovPX. 
a. Factors are constructed by means of a Cholesky decomposition, in which the ﬁrst factor is the policy surprise contained in a
policy statement, as inferred from the federal funds futures market; the second is the portion of the change in year-ahead policy
expectations (as measured by the change in the Eurodollar futures contract) not explained by (that is, orthogonal to) the ﬁrst fac-
tor; the third is the change in the ﬁve-year Treasury yield not explained by (orthogonal to) the ﬁrst two factors. 
b. Sample period is July 1991 to the present.
c. In basis points. Sample period is April 1998 to the present. 
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sions is explained by current policy surprises (the first factor), and that
the other four-fifths of the variance is captured by the second factor. This
result confirms a primary conclusion of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swan-
son,59 who argue that two factors are needed to explain the influence of
FOMC announcements on monetary policy expectations out to a horizon
of a year.
Also signiﬁcant is the ﬁnding that the second factor makes the largest
contribution to the variability in the ﬁve-year Treasury yield during the
hour around FOMC decisions. In terms of standard deviations, the contri-
bution of the second factor to the variation in the ﬁve-year yield is about
twice that of either the ﬁrst or the third factor. In terms of variances, the
second factor accounts for 68 percent of the variability of the ﬁve-year
yield during the event window, whereas the ﬁrst factor explains 12 per-
cent and the third factor 20 percent of the variance.
Having determined that policy expectations are determined to an
important degree by a second factor that represents inﬂuences on market
expectations of policy not captured in the policy decision itself, we next
ask whether the second factor is related to the FOMC’s communica-
tions.60 Informal inspection of the historical realizations of the various
factors reveals that the second factor has become increasingly important
in the latter part of the sample—the period when policy statements came
into regular use. Even during the years from 1994 to 1999, when policy
statements were used more sporadically, many of the large realizations of
the second factor coincided with policy statements. In contrast, larger
realizations of the ﬁrst and third factors do not seem to line up with dates
of policy statements.
To investigate more formally the link between FOMC statements and
the three factors, we follow an approach similar to that employed by Kohn
and Sack.61 As described in the previous section, Kohn and Sack showed
that, for given values of the policy surprise, the issuance of statements by
the FOMC increases the variability of market interest rates, suggesting
that statements contain information relevant to ﬁnancial markets. Here we
extend their approach in several ways, in part by examining the effects on
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60. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004) also address this issue and conclude that the
second factor is indeed related to FOMC statements.
61. Kohn and Sack (2003).
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“unanticipated” statements), by linking statements to policy expectations
at differing horizons (as summarized by the three factors), and by check-
ing whether the directional effects of policy statements on policy expecta-
tions seem reasonable.62
As a ﬁrst step, and in a manner analogous to Kohn and Sack’s
approach, we regress the squared values of each of the factors on several
dummy variables related to policy statements, to determine whether state-
ments “matter” for policy expectations at different horizons, as summa-
rized by the three factors, without having to quantify the statements. We
deﬁne the ﬁrst dummy, which we call STATEMENT, to equal 1 on any
date on which the FOMC released a policy statement following its meet-
ing, and zero otherwise. A positive estimated coefﬁcient on STATE-
MENT implies that this particular factor tends to be larger in magnitude
on dates on which a statement is released. Of the 116 policy decisions in
our sample, 56 were accompanied by statements.
Of course, a statement that market participants fully anticipated would
not be expected to generate a market reaction. With this in mind, we
deﬁne a second dummy variable (called STATEMENT SURPRISE) that
equals 1 on dates when the issued statement included important informa-
tion about the state of the economy or the path of monetary policy that a
substantial portion of market participants did not expect.
Obviously, assigning values to STATEMENT SURPRISE involves
some subjectivity, because investors’ expectations about statements can-
not be quantiﬁed as easily as their expectations for settings of the policy
rate. To construct this dummy variable, we read a set of commentaries
written before and after each statement was released, to determine
whether the statement was substantially as expected by market partici-
pants or instead surprised the markets. After-the-fact commentaries that
we examined included internal staff analyses from both the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and the Board of Governors of market reac-
tions to the policy decision and the statement, as well as next-day articles
about the FOMC’s decision from the Wall Street Journal. A drawback of
relying on after-the-fact analyses to determine which statements were sur-
prises, of course, is that the authors’ interpretations may have been inﬂu-
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62. Also, unlike Kohn and Sack (2003), who use daily data, we continue to use intraday
data.
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To guard against this source of bias, we also used several before-the-fact
sources, including a pre-FOMC-meeting survey of expectations for the
balance-of-risks (or policy bias) part of the statement, conducted by
Money Market Services and its successor Action Economics; commen-
taries put out just before each meeting by the ISI Group, a leading ﬁnan-
cial ﬁrm that specializes in monitoring FOMC action; and the results of a
survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that asks pri-
mary dealers about their expectations for the statement. We took all occa-
sions when the policy bias or the balance of risks differed from the
median survey response as surprises. Using these materials, we identiﬁed
thirty-one of the ﬁfty-six statements in our sample period as involving
some nonnegligible surprise.64
Table 2 presents the regression results; we focus ﬁrst on the odd-numbered
columns. Column 2-1 shows the results from regressing the square of the
first factor (the current policy surprise) against a constant term and the
two dummy variables. The ﬁrst dummy, which indicates the presence of
any statement accompanying an FOMC policy decision, enters the regres-
sion with a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. The most likely explanation
for this result is that, for much of the sample period, statements were
released only on days on which the federal funds rate was changed; not
surprisingly, policy rate surprises tend to be larger on days when the federal
funds rate target was changed than on days when no change in the target
was made. The coefﬁcient on the second dummy variable, STATEMENT
SURPRISE, is negative and significant, which suggests that the FOMC
views surprises in the policy rate and in the statement as substitutes, or
possibly that the FOMC was simply reluctant to issue surprising state-
ments at the same time that it was also surprising the markets with its
policy action.
The regression reported in column 2-3 shows that the squared second
factor, by contrast, appears to be driven entirely by statement surprises.
The coefﬁcient on STATEMENT SURPRISE is both highly statistically
signiﬁcant and economically important; the regression results imply that,
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reported that the market’s reaction was different from their ex ante assessment of the likely
response, suggesting that the retrospective bias may not have been severe.
64. The breakdown of statements into surprises and nonsurprises, together with a brief
commentary, is available from the authors on request.
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surrounding the release of the statement is about 196 basis points (the sum
of the constant term and both regression coefﬁcients) when the statement
is surprising, but only about 42 basis points (the constant term plus the
ﬁrst coefﬁcient) when the statement is as expected. Moreover, the vari-
ance of the second factor is not signiﬁcantly different from zero on days
when no statement is released or when the statement is as anticipated.
This result suggests that surprise statements have a major impact on pol-
icy expectations a year ahead.
The magnitude of the third factor seems unrelated to policy statements,
because neither dummy variable enters signiﬁcantly into the regression
for the square of that factor (column 2-5). In other words, we ﬁnd no evi-
dence that FOMC statements affect the ﬁve-year Treasury yield indepen-
dent of their effect on year-ahead expectations. (However, recall from
table 1 that independent variation in year-ahead policy expectations—the
second factor—accounts for the bulk of the variance of the ﬁve-year Trea-
sury yield during the periods surrounding FOMC decisions. Thus, holding
the current policy decision constant, a surprising statement has an impor-
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Table 2. Regressions of Squared Factors on Dummy Variables for Federal Reserve
Policy Statementsa
Dependent variable
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Independent variable 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6
Constant 64.7 64.7 24.1 24.1 3.2 3.2
(1.85) (1.82) (1.48) (1.51) (1.10) (1.10)
STATEMENTb 131.6** 131.6** 18.3 18.3 6.3 6.3
(2.04) (2.03) (0.61) (0.63) (1.18) (1.17)
STATEMENT –149.4** –139.5 153.3** 120.7** 8.1 7.9
SURPRISEc (–2.05) (–1.75) (4.54) (3.35) (1.33) (1.19)
PATH SURPRISEd –34.2 112.5** 0.6
(–0.32) (2.31) (0.07)
Adjusted R2 .04 .04 .26 .30 .07 .07
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 95 percent level. Factors are as deﬁned in
table 1.
b. Dummy variable set equal to 1 on dates when the FOMC released a policy statement following its meeting, and zero
otherwise.
c. Dummy variable set equal to 1 on dates when the FOMC issued a statement that included important information about the
state of the economy or the path of monetary policy that a substantial portion of market participants did not expect, and zero
otherwise. 
d. Dummy variable set equal to 1 on dates when the FOMC issued a statement that included important information about the
path of monetary policy that a substantial portion of market participants did not expect, and zero otherwise. 
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effects on one-year-ahead policy expectations.) As we saw above, the
third factor is quite small and may simply reﬂect residual noise in the ﬁve-
year yield.
Investors are most interested in statements that provide hints about the
FOMC’s inclinations regarding future policy actions (as opposed to, for
example, statements that describe past economic developments). From
the committee’s point of view, the effects on market expectations of state-
ments bearing on the future course of policy should also be of particular
interest, since this is the type of statement that theory suggests should be
most useful when the policy rate is near the zero bound. To examine
whether statements that provide new information about the likely future
path of monetary policy are particularly inﬂuential, we used the sources
noted above to identify nine statements among the thirty-one surprise
statements that seemed most explicitly focused on the likely future path of
policy. The dummy variable PATH SURPRISE takes a value of 1 on the
dates of these statements.
A number of these statements occurred recently, in a period when the
FOMC was attempting to provide additional stimulus to the economy
despite the fact that the federal funds rate had already been reduced to as
little as 100 basis points. For example, in August 2003 the FOMC stated
that  “policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable
period,” marking the ﬁrst time that the FOMC statement discussed an
extended outlook for its policy path.65 This phrase was repeated in FOMC
statements following the September, October, and December meetings.
At its January 2004 meeting the FOMC replaced the “considerable
period” phrase with the assertion that “the Committee believes that it can
be patient in removing its policy accommodation.” This substitution
caused long-dated Treasury yields to jump 15 to 25 basis points, a clear
indication that the committee’s language was important in shaping
longer-term policy expectations. Policymaking by thesaurus continued
through 2004. After repeating the “patient” language after its March
meeting, the FOMC in its May statement replaced this phrase with the
statement that it “believes that policy accommodation can be removed at
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through the end of our sample. These statements, because they are so
explicitly focused on the policy path, may provide the best natural exper-
iments for assessing what could be accomplished at the zero bound.
As can be seen in the even-numbered columns in table 2, the PATH
SURPRISE dummy enters signiﬁcantly only in the regression explaining
the square of the second factor, further conﬁrming the association of this
factor with policy statements. Relative to a situation in which an unsur-
prising statement is issued, a surprise statement about the likely future
course of policy increases the variance of the second factor during the
event window by 233 basis points (the sum of the coefﬁcients on surprise
statements and policy path surprise statements), indicating that statements
providing new information about the prospective path of policy have a
powerful effect on year-ahead policy expectations and, hence, indirectly
on the ﬁve-year Treasury yield as well.
So far we have shown that year-ahead policy expectations react
strongly to unexpected changes in the FOMC’s statement, in the sense
that the absolute change in year-ahead expectations tends to be much
larger when the content of the statement is unexpected. We have not yet
shown that the change in expectations is in the predicted direction, for
example that unexpectedly “hawkish” statements cause expectations to
shift toward a greater degree of policy tightening. To take this additional
step, while recognizing once again that the quantiﬁcation of purely quali-
tative statements is necessarily hazardous, we used the source materials
described earlier to “sign” the thirty-one surprise statements in terms of
their apparent implications for subsequent monetary policy actions. We
summarized this information in a dummy variable, SIGNED STATE-
MENT, which is assigned the value of +1 for surprise “hawkish” state-
ments (those that implied a higher future path of the federal funds rate
than previously expected), –1 for surprise “dovish” statements, and zero
for all other observations, including those with nonsurprising statements
or no statements at all. We then regressed the levels (not the squares) of
each of the three factors on the signed dummy variable. We also tried
regressing the levels of the factors on the signed values of statements cor-
responding to policy path surprises (SIGNED PATH, deﬁned as the prod-
uct of the SIGNED STATEMENT and PATH SURPRISE dummies.)
The results, shown in table 3, further strengthen our ﬁndings. Columns
3-1, 3-2, 3-5, and 3-6 show that no signiﬁcant relationship exists between
36 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
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contrast, signed surprises have a large and highly statistically signiﬁcant
effect on the second factor, with hawkish statements raising and dovish
statements lowering year-ahead policy expectations by 12 basis points on
average (column 3-3). The effects are even larger (16 basis points) when
we restrict our attention to the nine policy path surprises (column 3-4).
Recalling from table 1 that the loading of the ﬁve-year yield on the second
factor is 0.64, we can also estimate that, with the current policy surprise
held constant, a surprisingly hawkish statement raises the ﬁve-year yield
by about 8 basis points and a hawkish statement about the policy path
raises the yield by about 10 basis points.
Conditioning Effects of Policy Statements
The immediate effects of ofﬁcial FOMC statements on policy expecta-
tions likely underestimate the overall impact of FOMC communications
on expectations; for example, our focus on statements alone ignores the
potential effects of speeches and testimony by FOMC members. Also,
beyond their immediate effects, FOMC statements may affect the forma-
tion of policy expectations by inﬂuencing how those expectations respond
to various sorts of incoming data. In particular, to the extent that FOMC
policy commitments are conditional, that is, tied to speciﬁc economic
developments, policy expectations should react more strongly to macro-
economic news that bears on those developments.
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Table 3. Regressions of Factors on Signed Dummy Variables for Federal Reserve
Policy Statementsa
Dependent variable
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Independent variable 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6
SIGNED STATEMENT  1.4 11.5** –0.4
SURPRISEb (0.83) (10.21) (–0.68)
SIGNED PATH  –1.5 15.8** 1.3
SURPRISEc (–0.49) (6.38) (1.37)
Adjusted R2 –.03 –.03 .47 .26 –.02 –.01
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 95 percent level. Factors are as deﬁned in
table 1.
b. Dummy variable assigned the value of +1 on dates when the FOMC issued a surprise “hawkish” statement (implying an
increase in the federal funds rate), –1 on dates of surprise “dovish” statements (implying a decrease), and zero otherwise.
c. Product of PATH SURPRISE (see table 2 for deﬁnition) and SIGNED STATEMENT SURPRISE variables.
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on payroll employment.66 Throughout the recent period, the FOMC was
concerned about the “jobless” nature of the economic recovery and
repeatedly pointed to weakness in the labor market as a key factor shaping
the outlook for policy. When Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
introduced the phrase “considerable period” in his semiannual report to
Congress in July 2003, he indicated the Federal Reserve’s concerns about
resource utilization and “unwelcome disinﬂation.” (On several occasions
in congressional testimony, Greenspan has also indicated his preference
for the payroll employment series over the household employment series
as a measure of current conditions in the labor market.) Each FOMC
statement that used the “considerable period” language also discussed
labor market conditions, and the December 2003 statement tied the “con-
siderable period” outlook for policy closely to slack in resource use.
Statements since December 2003 have continued both to place substantial
weight on labor market conditions (as well as inﬂation) and to provide
information about the FOMC’s policy expectations.
With this background, if FOMC communication is effective, one might
expect to ﬁnd that ﬁnancial markets have become more sensitive to news
about payroll employment. Figure 2 conﬁrms this hypothesis: it shows the
responsiveness, over a thirty-minute window, of the ten-year Treasury
yield to surprises in monthly payrolls, where the surprise is deﬁned as the
reported payroll number less the median survey expectation as reported
by Money Market Services. The sample is divided into the period through
August 2003, just before the meeting when the “considerable period” lan-
guage was introduced, and the period from September 2003 to the pres-
ent. In the earlier period, as indicated by the thin regression line in ﬁgure 2,
a positive surprise of 100,000 payroll jobs translated into a 4-basis-point
increase in ten-year Treasury yields during the thirty-minute window.
Since September 2003 this responsiveness has strengthened, as is visible
from the larger data points. The regression line for the recent subsample
shows that ten-year Treasury yields increased by 11 basis points for every
surprise of 100,000 jobs above the consensus expectation. The difference
in coefﬁcients is statistically signiﬁcant.
38 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
66. A second important example, not pursued here, is the responsiveness of the market
to data on core inﬂation.
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ness of yields (and the associated policy expectations) to unexpected
changes in payroll employment, it should also be the case that markets have
responded less to macroeconomic developments not ﬂagged by the commit-
tee as likely to have a strong bearing on policy decisions. This should es-
pecially be the case over the period when, conditioned on the ongoing
sluggishness of hiring, the FOMC indicated that policy would remain
highly accommodative. That this latter conjecture is likely to be true is
shown by ﬁgure 3, which reports implied volatility measures derived from
options on Eurodollar futures. These measures are market-based estimates
of the expected volatility of short-term interest rates over two horizons:
four months and one year. As the ﬁgure shows, the short-horizon volatility
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2581-01_Bernanke_rev.qxd    1/18/05    13:13    Page  39measure fell to historic lows during the second half of 2003, but the same
result does not hold at the longer horizon. These data provide a bit of evi-
dence that the FOMC’s communications in the second half of 2003 re-
duced the volatility of (or “anchored”) near-term policy expectations.
Since we have seen that policy expectations simultaneously became more
sensitive to certain types of macroeconomic news, such as the payroll
report, the decline in overall volatility suggests that the responsiveness of
markets to other types of news declined.
Shaping Policy Expectations: Evidence from a Macroﬁnance Model
of the Term Structure
Our event studies conﬁrm that FOMC statements have important inﬂu-
ences, both direct and indirect, on private sector policy expectations. Event
studies have the drawback, however, of showing only very short term
effects. They may overstate the more important longer-term effects, if, for
example, yields tend to overreact in the period just around announcements;
or they may understate the longer-term effects, for example by not account-
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
Figure 3. Implied Volatility of the Federal Funds Rate, 1990–2004a
Percentage points
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
a. Data are widths of a 90 percent conﬁdence interval for the federal funds rate over the indicated horizon, derived from the
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address this issue by developing a benchmark macroﬁnance model of the
term structure. Here and in additional exercises in the remainder of the
paper, our model provides estimates of what the term structure would have
been on a given date, given the state of the economy and the stance of
monetary policy but excluding other factors. By comparing this bench-
mark estimate of the term structure with the actual term structure at crucial
junctures, we may be able to get a sense of the quantitative impacts of
these other factors on the maturity structure of interest rates.
To develop a baseline model of the Treasury yield curve, we estimate
an afﬁne term structure model (that is, a model that is linear in the fac-
tors).67 The afﬁne term structure model imposes a no-arbitrage condition
that links yields at every maturity of the term structure, thereby increasing
the efﬁciency of estimation and allowing us to forecast the entire yield
curve as a function of the variables designated as underlying factors. We
differ from most of the previous literature in identifying the underlying
factors that determine the term structure by means of observable indica-
tors of macroeconomic conditions and the stance of monetary policy, and
not relying on unobserved factors or longer-term yields as the assumed
drivers of term structure dynamics.
As to the dynamics of the underlying factors, we employ a vector
autoregression (VAR) in ﬁve observable variables: a measure of the
employment gap (payroll employment, detrended by a Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter); inﬂation over the past year, as measured by the deﬂator for per-
sonal consumption expenditures, excluding food and energy; expected
inﬂation over the subsequent year, taken from the Blue Chip survey and
with inﬂation deﬁned in terms of the GDP deﬂator (the Blue Chip survey
does not forecast core inﬂation); the federal funds rate; and the year-ahead
Eurodollar futures rate. Together these variables should provide a reason-
able summary of economic conditions, including the current setting of
monetary policy (as reﬂected in the federal funds rate) and the expected
path of policy over the near term (as captured by the Eurodollar futures
rate). The data are monthly from June 1982 (when the Eurodollar data
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67. Afﬁne term structure models were popularized by Dufﬁe and Kan (1996), whose
formalization encompasses earlier models due to Vasicek (1977), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross
(1985), and Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), among others. Bolder (2001) provides a useful
introduction to these models.
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included in the VAR.
As already noted, to measure the inﬂuence of these observed indicators
on the Treasury yield curve, we construct a no-arbitrage term structure
model in which the ﬁve economic and monetary indicators are treated as
factors. In general, Treasury yields are determined by two components:
the expected future path of one-period interest rates, and the excess
returns that investors demand as compensation for the risk of holding
longer-term instruments. The estimated VAR can be iterated to provide
forecasts for the one-period interest rate at each horizon (where we treat
the monthly average federal funds rate as the “one-period interest rate”).
In addition, we make a standard assumption of afﬁne models of the term
structure, namely, that equilibrium prices of risk are linear functions of
the factors (the variables in the VAR). With that assumption, the entire
Treasury yield curve can be priced from the VAR estimates.
To be more speciﬁc, suppose we write the estimated VAR in the fol-
lowing form:
where Xt is the vector of state variables. To develop the no-arbitrage part
of the model below, it will be convenient for the state variables to follow
a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process. Thus in equation 1 we have stacked
the VAR variables so that the state vector Xt includes the contemporane-
ous values of the ﬁve variables and three lags of the variables (hence Xt is
a 20 × 1 column vector).68
We assume that there is no arbitrage in the bond market, implying that
a single pricing kernel determines the values of all ﬁxed-income securi-
ties. The pricing kernel is determined by investors’ preferences for state-
dependent payouts. Speciﬁcally, the value of an asset at time t equals
Et[mt+1Yt+1], where Yt+1 is the asset’s gross return in period t + 1, and mt+1 is
the one-period pricing kernel. Because we will be considering zero-
coupon bonds, the payout from the bonds is simply their value in the fol-
lowing period, so that the following recursive relationship holds:
() [ ] ,
– 2 11
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68. Thus the ﬁrst ﬁve rows of the matrix   include the VAR estimates, and the rest of
the matrix contains zeros and ones at the appropriate locations.
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bond, P0
t+n, is normalized to equal 1.
Following the approach of Andrew Ang, Monika Piazzesi, and Min
Wei,69 we assume that the pricing kernel is conditionally log-normal, as
follows:
where the λt are the market prices of risk associated with the VAR inno-
vations (the source of uncertainty in the model), and yt
(1) is the one-period
interest rate expressed on a continuously compounded basis. As already
noted, we assume that the prices of risk are linear in the state variables:
We restrict the prices of risk to be zero for all but the first five ele-
ments of λt, and we assume that those prices of risk depend only on the
contemporaneous values of the VAR. (Recall that the final fifteen ele-
ments of the stacked column vector Xt are lags of the five factors.)
These assumptions imply that only thirty parameters must be estimated
in this block of the model, a manageable number while still allowing the
model the flexibility needed to provide a good empirical fit of the term
structure data.
Manipulation of equations 1 through 3 shows that the zero-coupon
yields can be written as linear functions of the state variables, as follows:
where an = –An/n and bn = –Bn/n, and the vectors An and Bn are determined
by the following recursive formulas:
The starting values for these equations are A1 = –δ0 and B1 = –δ1, and the
parameters δ0 and δ1 describe the relationship of the one-period yield to
() ( – ) – . 7 11 1 BB nn + = ′ ΦΣ λ δ
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69. Ang and Piazzesi (2003); Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2003).
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(1) =δ 0 +δ 1 ′Xt. In our application, because the
one-period yield (the federal funds rate) is included in the state variable,
this relationship is trivial: All elements of δ0 and δ1 are zero except for the
element of δ1 that picks out the current value of the federal funds rate,
which is set to unity.
Given a set of prices of risk, the entire Treasury yield curve can be
derived using equation 5. We estimate the prices of risk by minimizing
the sum of squared prediction errors for zero-coupon Treasury yields at
maturities of six months and one, two, three, four, ﬁve, seven, and ten
years. Our data are zero-coupon Treasury yields, based on the Fisher-
Nychka-Zervos yield curve for the period 1982 to 1987 and on the zero-
coupon yield curve constructed at the Board of Governors for the period
since 1987.70 Note that to some extent we are explaining one set of inter-
est rates by another, since the federal funds rate and the year-ahead
Eurodollar rate are included in the VAR and thus serve as factors. As
already mentioned, however, including the latter indicators in the VAR
serves the important function of capturing the effects of current and
expected monetary policy actions on the Treasury term structure; this will
be important later when we use the model to isolate relative supply effects
on Treasury yields. Moreover, our procedure implies no internal inconsis-
tency, because both indicators of monetary policy differ in substantive
respects (for example, in credit risk, liquidity, and maturity) from the
Treasury rates that they are being used to model.
Our model contributes to the growing literature that includes macro-
economic variables in no-arbitrage term structure models. An appealing
feature of our framework is the substantial simpliﬁcation in estimation
and analysis achieved by our assumption that all the factors driving the
term structure are observable economic and monetary variables. As noted
earlier, related models typically include unobserved factors as determi-
nants of the term structure and even of the observed economic variables in
the system.71 The use of unobserved factors has advantages in some appli-
cations, but it greatly complicates estimation and may make the economic
44 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
70. Fisher, Nychka, and Zervos (1995).
71. Related models include those of Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and Rudebusch and Wu
(2003).
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interpretation of the results more difﬁcult.72 Our approach instead directly
links the term structure to observable economic conditions, thereby pro-
viding us with an easily interpretable benchmark for gauging the potential
effects of unusual monetary policy strategies.
The estimated model does a quite creditable job of explaining the
behavior of the term structure over time. Figure 4 compares the ﬁtted and
actual time series for the two-year and ten-year Treasury yields. The
model predicts Treasury yields reasonably well at all maturities: as
reported in the ﬁrst column of table 4, the standard deviation of the
model’s prediction error is 33 basis points at the six-month maturity and
increases to around 80 basis points for longer maturities. Also shown in
ﬁgure 4 are the two-year and ten-year “risk-neutral” yields. These are
derived by setting the prices of risk equal to zero—that is, they are the
rates that investors would demand if they were risk neutral. The differ-
ences between these lines and the predicted yields, then, are estimated
term premiums. Figure 4 shows that estimated term premiums for longer-
dated securities have declined over time, presumably reﬂecting greater
stability in the economy and in policy, but they remain fairly large. Of
particular note is that variations in the term premium are estimated to
account for a signiﬁcant portion of the variation in long-term yields; part
of the reason is likely to be that the forecasting model does a better job
capturing low-frequency movements in the data than high-frequency
ones. Those residuals in predicting high-frequency movements, then, are
imputed to the term premium.
In the event-study analysis described earlier, we found that an impor-
tant part of the effect of a monetary policy decision is transmitted through
its impact on year-ahead policy expectations, but that expectations also
depend importantly on FOMC statements. The importance of year-ahead
policy expectations for longer-dated yields is generally conﬁrmed by our
term structure ﬁtting exercise. We can assess the importance of innova-
tions of the futures rate by ordering it last in a Cholesky decomposition.
In doing so, we are attributing as much as possible of the movements in
futures rates to the other variables. Even so, innovations to the futures rate
72. Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2003) employ a model in which, as in our analysis, the
pricing kernel is assumed to be a function of observable variables. However, the only
macroeconomic variable in their model is GDP growth, and they do not focus on the prop-
erties of the term structure model itself but rather on the implications of their framework for
predicting GDP growth.
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Blue Chip 
Financial Forecasts, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the Federal Reserve.
a. The predicted Treasury yields are generated by the term structure model, as described in the text. The risk-neutral Treasury 
yields are generated by the same model, but with the prices of risk set equal to zero.
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are important for explaining movements in the yield curve. As can be seen
in the second column of table 4, excluding the year-ahead futures rate
innovations from the VAR causes a signiﬁcant deterioration in the ﬁt of
the estimated model, particularly at shorter horizons. For example, doing
so raises the standard deviation of the prediction error for the two-year
Treasury yield from 73 basis points to 97 basis points. The inclusion of a
variable such as the year-ahead futures rate, and to a lesser extent the sur-
vey measure of inﬂation looking one year ahead, has the advantage of
improving the ﬁt of the model. But it also implies that some of the inﬂu-
ence of policy in shaping expectations will be captured by those variables
in the forecasting model. If so, our later attempt to interpret deviations of
actual yields from those predicted by the model will tend to be conserva-
tive, in that the macroﬁnance model may well capture some expectations
effects.
It is tempting to combine the result of the event study (that FOMC state-
ments have a substantial inﬂuence on year-ahead policy expectations) with
the result from the term structure ﬁtting exercise (that year-ahead policy
expectations are important determinants of Treasury yields) to conclude
that FOMC statements have an important inﬂuence on the term structure.
That conclusion may be a bit premature. Notably, the innovations to the
Eurodollar futures rate obtained from the VAR need not correspond
closely to the innovations to the same variable obtained from the high-
frequency event study. To illustrate this point, table 5 compares, for various
Table 4. Prediction Errors for Treasury Yields in the Term Structure Model
Basis points
Standard deviation of predicted yield 
VAR with  VAR without 
Maturity Eurodollar shocks Eurodollar shocks
6 months 33.0 62.1
1 year 50.3 78.9
2 years 73.3 97.4
3 years 81.2 100.7
4 years 82.5 98.3
5 years 81.5 95.0
7 years 83.3 93.3
10 years 80.8 87.8
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Blue Chip
Financial Forecasts, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the Federal Reserve.
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ahead Eurodollar futures rate, as calculated from the VAR (ﬁrst column)
and by summing the changes in the Eurodollar rate around FOMC deci-
sions (second column). In general, the variance of the VAR innovations to
the Eurodollar rate is signiﬁcantly greater than the variance of innovations
to the Eurodollar rate directly associated with FOMC decisions. Several
plausible explanations for this difference come to mind: First, the move-
ments of the Eurodollar rate in the hour around FOMC decisions certainly
do not capture all of the effects of FOMC communications, including the
effects of speeches and testimonies and the point, demonstrated earlier,
that FOMC statements can affect the responsiveness of policy expectations
to various kinds of macroeconomic news. Indeed, as table 5 illustrates, as
the FOMC has made greater use of communications strategies, particularly
since mid-2003, the variation of the Eurodollar rate around FOMC deci-
sions has risen, while the variation in the corresponding VAR innovation
has actually fallen, possibly reﬂecting better anchoring of short-term pol-
icy expectations. That said, it seems clear that not all of the VAR innova-
tion represents unmeasured communication effects; certainly, some part of
the VAR innovations to the Eurodollar futures rate reﬂects responses of
policy expectations to developments in the economy unrelated to FOMC
communications (and not captured by the economic variables included in
the VAR).
As a simple case study, we considered in more detail the VAR innova-
tions and the event-study innovations during the period in which the FOMC
48 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
Table 5. Year-Ahead Futures Shocks in Vector Autoregression and in Event Study
Basis points 
Standard deviation of innovations to the 
year-ahead Eurodollar futures rate
Sample perioda VAR shock Event-study shockb
July 1991 to January 1994 35.9 4.2
February 1994 to April 1999 35.2 6.8
May 1999 to July 2003 40.1 8.2
August 2003 to May 2004 25.2 11.7
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from sources listed in tables 1 and 4
a. Overall period begins in July 1991, the earliest date covered by the event study. Break dates include the date at which the
FOMC began announcing interest rate decisions (February 1994), the date at which the FOMC began issuing statements after
every meeting (May 1999), and the date at which the FOMC adopted the “considerable period” language (August 2003).
b. Aggregated to a monthly variable for comparability with the VAR shock.
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During that period, according to the event study, FOMC communications
pushed down the Eurodollar futures rate by a cumulative 19 basis points,
whereas the VAR shocks lowered the future rate by 63 basis points.73 As an
upper bound on the effect of the “considerable period” language on the term
structure, ﬁgure 5 uses our estimated model of the term structure to show
the effect on the yield curve associated with a 63-basis-point decline in the
Eurodollar futures rate. The model predicts an effect of the “considerable
period” language ranging from about 25 basis points at the two-year hori-
zon to about 7 basis points at the ten-year horizon.74
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73. Because the VAR models month-average variables, we sum the realization through
January 2004, because the “considerable period” language was not removed until the end
of that month.
74. Note that an innovation to the Eurodollar futures rate has an effect on Treasury
yields that is less than one for one at all maturities, suggesting that the futures rate mea-
sured here has excess variation relative to Treasury yields. This could reﬂect the (presum-
ably small) credit risk premium embedded in the futures rate, premiums for the relative
liquidity of the two instruments, or simply measurement noise.
Figure 5. Effects of Unexpected Futures Rate Outcomes on Treasury Zero-Coupon









Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the sources listed in ﬁgure 4.
a. Cumulative shift in Treasury yields of the indicated maturity predicted by the futures rate shocks from the VAR described in 
the text.
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shaped the policy expectations of investors, particularly over the past ﬁve
years. Indeed, yield curve movements around FOMC decisions cannot be
adequately described by the unexpected component of policy decisions,
but are instead inﬂuenced to a greater extent by a second factor, which
appears to be associated with surprises in the policy statements. These
ﬁndings suggest that policymakers may have some scope for inﬂuencing
investors’ expectations if the federal funds rate were to fall to the zero
bound.
The Effects of Changing the Supply of Assets
We turn now to evidence bearing on the third type of nonstandard pol-
icy, namely, changes in the composition of the central bank’s balance
sheet or targeted asset purchases. The question is whether substitution
among assets is sufﬁciently imperfect so that large purchases of a speciﬁc
class of asset might affect its yield, over and above any inﬂuence those
purchases might have on investors’ expectations about the future course
of the short-term interest rate. Of course, the Federal Reserve has not
undertaken any such actions in recent years. However, it still may be pos-
sible to learn about the effects of such actions by looking at the effects on
yields of other actual or expected changes in the relative supplies of
assets.
We identiﬁed three episodes in the past ﬁve years in which market par-
ticipants in the United States came to anticipate signiﬁcant changes in the
relative supplies of different Treasury securities. These three natural
experiments are, ﬁrst, the Treasury’s announcement in 1999 of a plan to
buy back government debt in the face of prospective budget surpluses;
second, the investment in Treasury securities by Asian ofﬁcial institutions
of the proceeds of their foreign exchange market interventions since
2002; and third, the emerging belief on the part of some ﬁnancial market
participants in the spring of 2003 that the Federal Reserve might resort to
targeted purchases of long-term Treasury securities in order to combat
incipient deﬂation.
We look at each episode through two prisms. First, we consider the
movement in a number of yields in narrow windows surrounding impor-
tant announcements—in essence relying on an event-study methodology
to isolate the market response to news. Then we apply our no-arbitrage
50 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
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pattern of yields, attributing residual movements to relative supply
effects.
the paydown of treasury bonds. We begin with “the case of the
disappearing Treasury bonds,” that is, the debt buyback episode of
1999–2000. In the mid-1990s a conﬂuence of economic forces and policy
changes turned federal budget deﬁcits into surpluses. By the end of the
decade, extrapolation of those trends led to forecasts that Treasury debt
would disappear by 2010.75 The Treasury dealt with that windfall in three
stages. Initially, it cut the issuance of Treasury bills as the deﬁcit shrank,
which reportedly led to some deterioration of liquidity in that segment of
the market and a shift toward three-month Eurodollar instruments as the
hedging vehicles of choice. Next, the Treasury trimmed the issuance of
longer-term securities by eliminating a few maturities and scaling back
the volume of the remainder. Third, the Treasury announced in August
1999 that it was considering buying back some older, off-the-run issues,
so that its remaining auctions would remain sizable enough to retain
investors’ interest.
Developments in the market for Treasury bonds are most interesting
for our purposes because the expected supply of those securities changed
abruptly. Two events stand out as marking a signiﬁcant shift in investors’
view of the prospects for Treasury bond issuance, namely, the midquarter
refunding announcements of February 2000 and November 2001. At the
2000 refunding, the under secretary of the Treasury for domestic ﬁnance,
Gary Gensler, made a comment suggesting that the ten-year note would
replace the thirty-year bond as the benchmark long-term security, trigger-
ing speculation that the issuance of thirty-year bonds would be discon-
tinued. At the November 2001 refunding announcement, the Treasury
conﬁrmed that it would stop selling the long-term bond.
The supply of bonds was also being reduced by Treasury debt buy-
backs. Actual market repurchases began in March 2000 and had cumu-
lated to $67 billion when the repurchases ended in 2002. Only bonds
were purchased, the bulk of which matured beyond 2015. These debt
buybacks represented a significant relative supply shock, as they were
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75. Reinhart and Sack (2000) review the economic consequences of such an outcome.
Auerbach and Gale (2000) provided a real-time reminder of the ﬁckleness of far-ahead ﬁs-
cal forecasts.
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the outstanding stock of bonds (as of the beginning of 2000). Moreover,
the buybacks were widely expected to be much larger than they were,
with some dealers in early 2000 estimating that they would reach $100 bil-
lion a year soon thereafter. Thus, in terms of anticipated supply, the shock
was much larger.
Views about the magnitude of debt buybacks seem to evolve over time
and thus do not lend themselves easily to event-study analysis. However,
we can look at the immediate market impact of the two quarterly refund-
ing announcements, identiﬁed above, that provided information about the
discontinuation of bond issuance. The news from these announcements
bore primarily on the pattern of sales rather than on the outlook for net
issuance of government debt. Even so, as shown in table 6, the Treasury
yield curve rotated down dramatically in both cases when investors
learned that the managers of the government debt would shy away from
longer-maturity securities.
The market’s reaction is seen more starkly in the movement in yields
across the maturity spectrum in the month bracketing the February
announcement, as plotted in ﬁgure 6.76 No doubt, macroeconomic news
relevant to interest rate expectations and risk attitudes and perceptions
also came out during that month. But the fact that yields on bonds as
opposed to notes declined sharply over a month in which important infor-
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76. For the past three decades, the longest-maturity security the Treasury issued has
been either the ten-year or the thirty-year bond. Points on the yield curve beyond the ten-
year maturity, accordingly, come from thirty-year securities of varying issue dates. The
four-year gap in the ﬁgure corresponds to a gap in Treasury issuance.
Table 6. Changes in Treasury Yields around Quarterly Refunding Announcementsa
Basis points
Date of quarterly refunding
Maturity February 2000 November 2001
2 years –51
5 years –13 –9
10 years –13 –20
30 years –27 –43
Source: GovPX.
a. Changes in the yields of on-the-run issues from the day before the announcement to the day after.
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released seems suggestive of the possibility that relative supplies matter.
We can also look at this episode using our estimated term structure
model to control for variations in the economy and monetary policy over
the period surrounding the buyback news. Figure 7 shows the prediction
error of the model for the twenty-year Treasury yield in the period around
the debt buyback.77 We see that yields during this period dropped from
about 20 basis points above to about 80 basis points below the prediction
of the model (which, again, controls for the effects of current and expected
monetary policy).
The decline in bond yields during the buyback period is signiﬁcant in
economic terms. To make a rough assessment of their statistical signiﬁ-
cance, we performed a simple bootstrapping exercise with the model by
ﬁrst forecasting the yield curve for January and February 2000 (about the
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77. In order to include the twenty-year Treasury yield in the model, we reestimated the
prices of risk. The predicted yields at other maturities did not change materially.
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observed just before the start of the period. We then added shocks by ran-
domly drawing observations from the set of historical errors of both the
macroeconomic and yield curve variables over the entire period. By
repeating this process 10,000 times, we were able to get some sense of
whether the observed errors were outside standard conﬁdence bands. In
fact, conditional on our model, the fall in the twenty-year Treasury yield
early in 2000 had an ex ante probability of occurring of less than 10 per-
cent—that is, the observed decline in the twenty-year yield appears to be
statistically signiﬁcant. The ex post errors observed along the yield curve
at shorter maturities, however, were much more likely to have occurred
by chance. These results support the intuition derived from the marked
shift in the yield curve already shown in ﬁgure 6: the buybacks signiﬁ-
cantly altered the shape of the long end of the Treasury yield curve and
had no material effects on shorter maturities, supporting the view that rel-
ative supplies matter.
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Figure 7. Prediction Errors of the Term Structure Model for Twenty-Year 
Zero-Coupon Treasury Yields, 1993–2002a
Basis points
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the sources listed in ﬁgure 4.
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model is unlikely to capture all the determinants of yields or to control ade-
quately for shifts in expectations. In addition, the precise magnitude of the
effects is not clear: the size of the shock is hard to determine because we do
not know the probability that investors were attaching to a sizable paydown.
Moreover, we cannot be sure that the effects shown here are scalable in a
predictable manner; hence these results give little quantitative information
to policymakers contemplating targeted asset purchases. Finally, as dis-
cussed earlier, movements in Treasury yields arising from targeted pur-
chases need not pass through to the interest rates on private transactions that
presumably inﬂuence spending decisions. As a bit of evidence on this last
point, swap spreads—a good indicator of risk premiums on private sector
securities—widened noticeably at the thirty-year maturity (but not at the
two-year maturity) during the period when long-dated Treasury yields
declined (ﬁgure 8). The sharp increase in long-term swap spreads and its
subsequent unwinding coincide closely with the dip in prediction errors in
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Figure 8. Interest Rate Swap Spreads, 1997–2004a
Basis points
Source: Bloomberg.
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this topic.
ﬁgure 7. Thus private sector interest rates apparently did not follow the long
end of the Treasury curve down as investor concerns regarding the avail-
ability of certain maturity classes of Treasuries mounted.
foreign ofﬁcial purchases of u.s. treasury securities. In the
wake of the Asian currency crisis in 1998, policymakers in many Asian
economies apparently decided that it was desirable to limit ﬂuctuations of
their currencies against the dollar. The result has been a steady accumula-
tion of dollar reserves, often in the form of Treasury securities. For
instance, securities held in custody at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York on behalf of foreign ofﬁcial institutions now total about $1
1⁄4 trillion,
about double the amount at the end of 1998. Japanese authorities, in par-
ticular, intervened heavily in foreign exchange markets from 2003 to the
ﬁrst quarter of 2004 in an effort to counter or slow the yen’s appreciation
against the dollar. Japanese intervention purchases totaled $177 billion in
2003 and $138 billion in the ﬁrst quarter of 2004. The Japanese Ministry
of Finance holds the proceeds of its intervention activities as either bank
deposits or Treasury securities, and its deposit holdings generally are
reinvested in Treasuries over time. According to market reports, those
purchases have tended to be concentrated in maturities of no more than
ten years. The Japanese interventions in the ﬁve quarters ending in 2004:1
cumulated to about $300 billion, which bond market participants antici-
pated would be invested in Treasury securities. Since the Japanese inter-
ventions were presumably only weakly linked at best to expectations
about future U.S. monetary policy, these purchases provide the basis for a
second natural experiment for testing the relationship between relative
asset supplies and yields.
The simplest exercise is to regress the change in various Treasury
yields on the dollar volume of intervention.78 Although the interventions
were not publicly announced, an examination of newspaper articles indi-
cates that operations were immediately recognized by market partici-
pants, who also generally appeared to have an accurate understanding of
the scale as well. Thus, even though foreign exchange market transactions
settle two days after the transaction (t + 2), the effects on Treasury yields
should occur at date t, as market participants anticipate near-term pur-
chases of Treasury securities. However, to allow for the possibility that in
56 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
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settlement, we looked at changes in yields from day t – 1 to day t + 2. The
sample includes all Japanese interventions from January 3, 2000, to
March 3, 2004. As can be seen in the ﬁrst column of table 7, two-, ﬁve-,
and ten-year Treasury yields all fell sharply on dates around Japanese
interventions, and the estimated coefﬁcients are highly statistically signif-
icant. Treasury bill yields did not react to the interventions, however, per-
haps because they are pinned down by the current and near-term expected
path of the federal funds rate.
Returning to ﬁgure 8, swap spreads did not move materially in the
period of heavy Japanese intervention, suggesting that any effects on
benchmark Treasury yields were transmitted to yields on private securi-
ties. This contrasts with the experience during the bond paydown episode
and may be due to the fact that the Treasury buybacks were concentrated
exclusively at the long end of the yield curve, whereas Japanese pur-
chases probably spanned a wider band of the maturity spectrum, in which
both the Treasury and private markets are deeper.
Although these results are suggestive of an important role for relative
asset supplies in the determination of yields, they suffer from potential
problems of joint endogeneity. For example, weak economic data could
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Table 7. Response of Treasury Yields to Japanese Foreign Exchange Interventiona
Basis points per $1 billion 
Excluding days of 
All days in major U.S. data 
Maturity sample period releasesb
3 months –0.18 –0.18
(–1.16) (–0.80)
2 years –0.78** –0.55**
(–3.00) (–1.99)
5 years –0.83** –0.66**
(–2.37) (–1.98)
10 years –0.73** –0.66**
(–2.29) (02.14)
No. of observations 1,086 892
No. of interventions 140 112
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Table reports coefﬁcients from a regression of the change in the yield of off-the-run issues from the day before an interven-
tion to the day of settlement (two days later) on the size of the intervention; the sample period is January 2000 to March 2004.
Numbers in parentheses are t statistics, where standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the
approach of Hodrick (1992).
b. Days excluded are those of the release of reports on employment, GDP, business activity (ISM), retail sales, or consumer
conﬁdence.
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prompting foreign exchange intervention by the Japanese finance min-
istry. To try to address this problem, we excluded from the sample all
days with major U.S. data releases (see the notes to table 7). Their exclu-
sion produced smaller and less statistically significant coefficients
(shown in the second column of table 7), but the results remain broadly
unchanged.
This episode provides us another opportunity to apply the no-arbitrage
term structure model to control for a changing macroeconomic environ-
ment. The results, shown in ﬁgure 9, indicate that both ﬁve-year and ten-
year Treasury yields remained below the model’s predictions by an
average of 50 to 100 basis points over the period January 2000 to March
2004. This suggests that some force not captured in the model was exert-
ing downward pressure on yields over this period. But although the evi-
dence is suggestive of effects from Ministry of Finance purchases, it is
not conclusive. Indeed, yields moved down to those levels in advance of
the sizable Japanese intervention (but of course did not move back).
Moreover, as table 4 indicated, prediction errors of this magnitude are not
uncommon.
To assess the statistical signiﬁcance of these ﬁndings, we repeated the
bootstrapping procedure described earlier, this time with the goal of
putting conﬁdence bands around yield predictions from May 2002 to
April 2003. Those results suggest that the underprediction of yields of
Treasury securities with maturities from one to ten years was quite
unlikely given the structure of the model, as the observed errors differed
signiﬁcantly from zero at better than the 10 percent conﬁdence level. We
would hesitate, however, to ascribe this effect exclusively to foreign pur-
chases of Treasury securities because, as we discuss next, other important
events were leaving their imprint on yields at about the same time.
the 2003 deﬂation scare. From the fall of 2002 through the summer
of 2003, with the economy remaining weak, inﬂation low and apparently
falling, and the federal funds rate quite low, FOMC members began to
talk about the risks of deﬂation in the United States and the possible
responses of monetary policy if the federal funds rate were to hit its lower
bound. Table 8 provides a brief chronology of relevant speeches and tes-
timonies by Federal Reserve ofﬁcials during this period.
Although Federal Reserve ofﬁcials consistently referred to the risk of
deﬂation as “remote” and the FOMC’s planning for the contingency of
58 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
2581-01_Bernanke_rev.qxd    1/18/05    13:13    Page  58hitting the ZLB as purely precautionary in nature, some market partici-
pants apparently interpreted these and other public comments as indicating
that the Federal Reserve was seriously considering “unconventional” pol-
icy measures—in particular, purchasing large amounts of longer-term
Treasuries. The perceived likelihood of such actions seemed to peak after
the May FOMC meeting, when the committee pointed to the (remote) risk of
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Figure 9. Prediction Errors of the Term Structure Model for Five- and Ten-Year




Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the sources listed in figure 4.
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longer-term Treasuries was seen to be taken off the table when the June
FOMC statement did not mention it, and when Chairman Greenspan testi-
ﬁed to Congress in July that “situations requiring special policy actions
are most unlikely to arise.”79 Again, large movements in Treasury yields
were observed on many of those days, with little alternative explanation.80
Most notably, the ten-year Treasury yield fell sharply on the May FOMC
statement (20 basis points) and after the chairman’s speech in early June
(10 basis points), and then rose abruptly following the June FOMC state-
ment (26 basis points) and the chairman’s testimony in July (20 basis
points).
Of course, the FOMC never undertook targeted purchases of Treasury
securities, but in an efﬁcient market even the incorrect anticipation of
such an event should affect yields. Figure 9 shows a sharp downward
spike in the model errors in May and June 2003, which is reversed in July.
These ﬁndings, taken at face value, suggest that the perceived possibility
of Treasury purchases had an impact on the order of 50 basis points or
more. The unexplained dip in yields in May and June is highly statistically
signiﬁcant, based on a bootstrapping exercise similar to that described
above. Once again, however, one must be particularly wary of identiﬁca-
tion issues. The events that conveyed information about the possibility of
Federal Reserve purchases of Treasuries most likely also conveyed infor-
mation to the public about the risk of deﬂation. Changes in the perceived
risk of deﬂation would affect long-term yields independent of supply
effects. Moreover, some overlap exists between this episode and the
period of Ministry of Finance purchases, discussed earlier.
If the Federal Reserve were willing to purchase an unlimited amount of
a particular asset—say, a Treasury security—at a ﬁxed price, there is little
doubt that it could establish that asset’s price. Presumably, this would be
true even if the Federal Reserve’s commitment to purchase the long-lived
asset were promised for a future date.
60 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
79. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Testimony of Chairman Alan
Greenspan: Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Con-
gress,” July 15, 2003 (www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2003/july/testimony.htm).
80. The fact that rates did not uniformly change by large amounts on all the dates listed
is not surprising, because other, unrelated news important to ﬁnancial markets may have
been released on some days and because the events themselves varied in the extent they
provided new information.
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Table 8. Notable Events and Changes in Treasury Yields during the 
2003 Deﬂation Scare
Change in yielda
Date Event Content 2-year 10-year
November 21, 2002 Bernanke speech Presents arguments for  7 6
making sure “it” 
(deﬂation) doesn’t  
happen in United States
December 19, 2002 Greenspan speech Says United States is  –7 –10
nowhere close to sliding 
into a “pernicious” 
deﬂation
March 30, 2003 Reinhart speech Discusses policy options  –5 –9
at the zero bound
May 6, 2003b FOMC statement Points to risk of an  –9 –20
“unwelcome substantial 
fall in inﬂation”
May 22, 2003 Greenspan  Argues deﬂation is a  –1 –5
testimony “serious” issue but the 
risks are “minor”
May 31, 2003 Reinhart speech Emphasizes importance  7 2
of shaping expectations
June 3, 2003 Greenspan speech Mentions continued risk  –13 –10
of declining inﬂation, 
need for a “ﬁrebreak”
June 25, 2003b FOMC eases, issues  Smaller-than-expected  29 26
statement easing; statement does 
not mention unconven-
tional policy measures
July 15, 2003 Greenspan  “Situations requiring  9 20
testimony special policy actions are 
most unlikely to arise”
July 23, 2003 Bernanke speech FOMC should be willing  –4 –4
to cut the federal funds 
rate to zero if necessary
August 12, 2003 FOMC statement Drops “substantial” 52 0
from statement on risk 
of “unwelcome fall in 
inﬂation”
Source: GovPX.
a. Except where noted otherwise, changes are daily changes in on-the-run Treasury yields. Dates of changes that were strongly
associated with the event listed are in italics. 
b. Changes in yields are two-day changes, since the market continued to respond on the day after the FOMC meeting.
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investors in that security with a put option allowing them to sell back
their holdings to the central bank at an established price. We can use our
term structure model to price that option. As a purely illustrative exam-
ple, suppose the Federal Reserve announced its willingness to purchase
the current ten-year, zero-coupon Treasury security one year hence at a
yield of 5
1⁄2 percent. We will consider the value of this option, jumping
off from the last observation used in estimating our model, that of May
2004. (We assume that the rate in May 2004 equals the value predicted
by our model rather than the actual rate prevailing in that month.) With-
out this commitment, according to our model, the yield on that security
would be expected to be 5.67 percent one year hence, implying that the
put option has a 58 percent chance of ending up in the money. (The yield
is given by y(9)
t+12 = a9 + b9Xt+12.) The strike price of the option will be K =
exp(–9 × cap), where in our example cap = 0.055.
The price of the put option is
We can compute this expectation by doing 10,000 simulations of the
model. Note that the simulations determine the correlation between the
payouts on the option and the value that risk-averse investors place on those
payouts (which depends on the evolution of the state variables on the path
to the payout). The results indicate that this option would lower today’s ten-
year rate by 34 basis points, or more than the 17 basis points by which the
option is in the money because the convexity of the option gives it value.
Thinking of a pegging strategy in terms of options also highlights the
potential that the pass-through to private securities of such a strategy
might be limited. In this case, those investors holding a ten-year Treasury
security receive the put option, but the holder of, say, a ten-year high-
grade corporate bond does not. Thus the value of the put option would be
reﬂected in the price of the corporate bond only to the extent that the mar-
ginal investor viewed Treasury and corporate securities as close substi-
tutes. As shown in ﬁgure 8, and in contrast to the prediction of theory,
swap spreads actually narrowed in the ﬁrst half of 2003, when deﬂation-
ary fears were building, and widened after those fears lifted later in the
year. The range of variation, however, is quite narrow and so may relate
to other macroeconomic and idiosyncratic developments.
() [ – exp(–– )] . 8 123 1 2 9 91 2 put = ′ {} +++ + +
+ Emm m m K a b X tt t t t t K
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So far we have made use of a variety of natural experiments from
recent U.S. experience to try to gauge the potential effectiveness of pol-
icy tools at or near the ZLB. In particular, we have analyzed the effects
on market expectations of FOMC statements (relevant for strategies that
involve the shaping of policy expectations) and considered how the net
supply of various Treasury securities influences the yield curve (rele-
vant for strategies that involve the size or composition of the central
bank’s balance sheet). The possible effectiveness of such policies in the
U.S. context is of great interest, but of course the inferences made are
necessarily somewhat indirect, because the policy rate in the United
States has remained at least 100 basis points above zero. In contrast,
Japan is a modern industrial economy that has actually grappled with
the ZLB for some seven years now; and although the Japanese economy
differs from that of the United States in many ways (notably in its finan-
cial structure), its experience still should provide useful lessons for the
United States and other industrial countries. In this section we apply
some of the same methods used in the U.S. analysis toward understand-
ing the experience of Japan.
An Event Study of Policies of the Bank of Japan
We begin our analysis of Japanese monetary policy by conducting an
event study analogous to the one we conducted for the United States. As
in the U.S. case, the objective is to analyze how monetary policy expecta-
tions at different horizons (as measured in ﬁnancial markets) respond to
central bank statements. Because the Bank of Japan in recent years has
used its statements not only to try to shape expectations, but also to pro-
vide information regarding its programs of quantitative easing and tar-
geted asset purchases, in principle the event study should cast light on the
effectiveness of all three types of nonstandard policy options available to
an economy at or near the ZLB. In practice, the relatively small number of
BOJ policy statements in our sample leads to results that are less sharp
than we would like. In the latter part of this section, therefore, we report
results based on estimation of the term structure model for Japan.
Two preliminary issues must be addressed before proceeding to the
details of the event study. First, the BOJ did not gain its independence
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(Before the BOJ became independent, monetary policy in Japan was
largely controlled by the Ministry of Finance.) We include in our sample
all policy meetings and dates of policy decisions by the BOJ since inde-
pendence, which gives us 110 observations. Note that, during most of the
sample period, the overnight interest rate was very close to zero. Second,
intraday ﬁnancial data are difﬁcult to obtain for Japan, and so we are
forced to rely on daily data. To complicate matters further, on some occa-
sions BOJ statements have been released just before the close of Japanese
ﬁnancial markets, whereas at other times they were released just after the
close. Because we could not easily ascertain the exact timing of all
releases, to avoid contamination of the results we examine two-day
changes in the ﬁnancial market variables considered, from the day before
each policy meeting to the day after. The use of a considerably longer
event window than in the U.S. analysis increases the scope for factors
other than policy actions or announcements to inﬂuence the ﬁnancial vari-
ables. The extra noise will reduce the efﬁciency of our estimates but
should not bias the results.
As in the event study for the United States, we employ three market-
based measures of policy expectations at various horizons. The ﬁrst is
intended to capture the unexpected component of changes in the policy
interest rate, the (overnight) call rate. Unfortunately, we cannot measure
these surprises in exactly the same way as we do for the FOMC, because
there is not an active futures market on the call rate in Japan. Instead we
measure current policy surprises as the change during the event window
in the ﬁrst Euroyen futures contract to expire, which reﬂects unexpected
changes in the policy rate over a slightly longer horizon.81 Innovations to
policy expectations at the one-year and the ﬁve-year horizons are mea-
sured as changes during the event window in the year-ahead Euroyen
futures rate and in the ﬁve-year zero-coupon Japanese government bond
(JGB) yield. These two indicators of policy expectations are essentially
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expiration; in practice, the ease with which investors can switch among money-market
assets ensures that this rate will be closely tied to the average policy rate expected to prevail
over that interval. The Euroyen futures contract expires 1
1⁄2 months ahead on average,
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United States.82
As in the U.S. event study, we apply a Cholesky decomposition to
derive three candidate factors to explain the movements in the market-
based policy indicators in the period around BOJ decisions. By construc-
tion, the ﬁrst factor corresponds to unexpected changes in the current
policy setting during the period around BOJ decisions, as measured by the
change in the nearest Euroyen futures contract. The second factor, equal
to the part of the change in the year-ahead futures contract that is ortho-
gonal to the ﬁrst factor, is intended to represent year-ahead policy expecta-
tions not explained by changes in the current policy setting. Finally, the
third factor equals the change in the ﬁve-year zero-coupon JGB yield not
explained by the ﬁrst two factors.
The links between these factors and the policy indicators, shown in the
top panel of table 9, are remarkably similar to those found for the FOMC
(top panel of table 1). Notably, as in the U.S. event study, we ﬁnd in the
case of Japan that the ﬁrst factor has an effect on longer-term interest rates
that diminishes with maturity, and that the loading of the ﬁve-year yield
on the second factor is signiﬁcantly greater than that on the ﬁrst factor.
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82. The Euroyen futures contracts trade on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Data for
the zero-coupon ﬁve-year JGB yield were taken from Bloomberg.
Table 9. Factor Decomposition of Monetary Policy Indicators, Japana
Effect or standard deviation Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Loading of factor on
Current policy setting 1.00 0.00 0.00
Year-ahead futures rate 0.55 1.00 0.00
Five-year yield 0.32 0.64 1.00
Standard deviation of effect of factor onb
Current policy setting 3.4 0 0
Year-ahead futures rate 1.9 3.0 0
Five-year yield 1.1 1.9 3.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Bloomberg, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the Bank of Japan.
a. Factors are constructed by means of a Cholesky decomposition, in which the ﬁrst factor is the policy surprise contained in a
policy statement, as inferred from the nearest Euroyen futures contract; the second is the portion of the change in year-ahead pol-
icy expectations (as measured by the change in the year-ahead futures contract) not explained by (that is, orthogonal to) the ﬁrst
factor; and the third is the change in the ﬁve-year zero-coupon JGB yield not explained by (orthogonal to) the ﬁrst two factors.
Sample period is April 1998 to the present.
b. In basis points. 
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panel of table 9, differ from the U.S. case. In particular, the ﬁrst and sec-
ond factors are much smaller (as measured by their standard deviations,
the diagonal elements in the table) than in the U.S. event study (bottom
panel of table 1). That is, changes in both current and year-ahead policy
expectations in periods around BOJ decisions have been more subdued
than in the U.S. case. However, the standard deviation of the third factor,
which reﬂects longer-horizon policy expectations, is about the same, at
3.5 basis points, in the Japanese and the U.S. cases. The inﬂuence of the
ZLB may explain the limited variation in the ﬁrst two factors: both cur-
rent and year-ahead futures rates were near zero over much of the sample,
which restricted changes in policy expectations and rates in the downward
direction at least. However, the ZLB is not the whole story; even in the
period before 2001, when the year-ahead futures rate was generally above
50 basis points, the standard deviation of the second factor was only
slightly higher (3.9 basis points) than in the sample as a whole (results not
shown). Overall, it appears that the scope for the Bank of Japan to “use”
the second factor, or its willingness to do so, was less than in the case of
the Federal Reserve over the same period.83
As in the U.S. event study, we are interested in examining the relation-
ship between the three factors describing changes in policy expectations
and the statements issued by the central bank. We again deﬁne a dummy
variable, STATEMENT, that equals 1 on dates when the BOJ released
policy statements and zero otherwise. As in the U.S. analysis, we also
deﬁne a dummy variable, STATEMENT SURPRISE, that indicates state-
ments deemed to be surprising in signiﬁcant aspects to market partici-
pants. To determine which statements were surprises, we again relied on
several after-the-fact documents, including internal write-ups prepared by
the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and articles in the
Wall Street Journal, and one before-the-fact source, a series of commen-
taries prepared by Nikko/Citigroup just before each BOJ meeting.
Of the 110 observations in our sample, 19 involved the release of state-
ments about the economy or monetary policy; we exclude 10 statements
concerned only with various technical aspects of monetary policy opera-
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83. An institutional explanation for the smaller second factor in Japan is the BOJ’s
practice of releasing policy statements only in conjunction with policy actions, rather than
after every scheduled meeting.
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19 statements, 10 were identiﬁed by our methods as surprises.84
As in the U.S. event study, we proceeded by regressing the squared
factors on the dummy variables indicating statements and surprising
statements. Again, following Kohn and Sack,85 the use of the squared
factors as dependent variables allows us to determine whether statements
were associated with large changes in policy expectations (large realiza-
tions of the factors), without requiring us to specify the “direction” of the
statements.
The regression results, shown in table 10, differ considerably from
those found for the Federal Reserve (table 2). First, we find that the
square of the first factor has a statistically significant relationship to
STATEMENT SURPRISE but not to STATEMENT. One interpretation
is that, unlike the FOMC, which appears reluctant to surprise the market
in terms of both the policy setting and the statement at the same meet-
ing, the BOJ often did so. Indeed, a review of the record shows that the
BOJ on several occasions combined announcements of major policy
innovations with unexpected changes in the setting of the interest rate.
Notably, the announcement of the adoption of the zero-interest-rate pol-
icy on February 12, 1999, coincided with a 9-basis-point policy rate sur-
prise by our measure, as the call rate was reduced from 25 basis points
to a value “as low as possible,” initially 15 basis points; and the intro-
duction of quantitative easing on March 19, 2001, coincided with an 11-
basis-point policy surprise, as the call rate was reduced from 12.5 basis
points to essentially zero.
Second, and in striking contrast with the results for the FOMC, we find
no evident relationship between the second factor and the BOJ’s release
of statements, whether surprising or not. This result, together with the
small magnitude of the second factor already reported, suggests again
that the BOJ was either unable or unwilling to influence year-ahead pol-
icy expectations with its statements. (In making this interpretation, how-
ever, we again note that the Japanese sample is much smaller and that a
coarser two-day window was used rather than the one-hour time span in
the U.S. case.)
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84. A description of all statements over the period and our method of coding them is
available from the authors on request.
85. Kohn and Sack (2003).
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ization of the third factor is linked to the issuance of surprising statements
by the central bank. However, this ﬁnding is largely the product of a sin-
gle observation, the February 12, 1999, statement announcing the intro-
duction of the ZIRP. Standard reasoning suggests that the announcement
of the ZIRP should have inﬂuenced the third factor by leading to a drop in
long-term bond yields; surprisingly, the third factor actually rose by
14 basis points that day. Our reading suggests that market participants
were disappointed that the statement did not announce large-scale BOJ
purchases of JGBs, as had been rumored. Perhaps, then, we should think
of this important observation as consisting of two surprises working in
opposite directions.
To examine the effects of BOJ statements further, we categorized the
surprising statements into three types: statements providing new informa-
tion about the likely path of policy (PATH SURPRISE, analogous to the
variable of that name in the event study for the Federal Reserve); state-
ments announcing an unexpected change in the BOJ’s target for purchases
of JGBs (JGB SURPRISE); and statements announcing unexpected changes
in the BOJ’s target for commercial banks’ current account balances, in the
period following the introduction of quantitative easing (CAB SURPRISE).
In principle, this categorization should provide information on the relative
effects of changes in policy expectations, targeted purchases of securities,
and quantitative easing. Statements were allowed to fall into more than
one category, if appropriate.
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Table 10. Regressions of Squared Factors on Dummy Variables for Bank of Japan
Policy Statementsa
Dependent variable
Independent variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Constant 7.4 8.2** 10.9**
(1.79) (2.78) (4.18)
STATEMENT –1.2 –1.2 –5.7
(–0.09) (–0.12) (–0.66)
STATEMENT SURPRISE 50.5** 10.4 25.8**
(2.79) (0.81) (2.25)
Adjusted R2 .12 .01 .06
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 95 percent level. Factors are as deﬁned in
table 9. Independent variables are deﬁned in a manner analogous to the deﬁnitions in table 2 for the United States.
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number of statements in each category is relatively small. We identiﬁed
only two statements as potential path surprises: the introduction of the
ZIRP in February 1999 and the introduction of quantitative easing in
March 2001. These, of course, represented major shifts in policy strategy,
and thus their effects may differ from those of the policy path surprises
identiﬁed in the U.S. event study. Five BOJ statements announced
changes in the target for JGB purchases (including the implementation of
the quantitative easing program), three of which we identiﬁed as surprises
to the market. Ten statements during the sample period announced
changes in the target for banks’ current account balances (including the
statement that initiated the program), of which six were identiﬁed as sur-
prises to the market.
Because the direction as well as the magnitude of statement effects is
important, we report here results based on the “signed” dummy variable
approach introduced in the earlier section.86 Speciﬁcally, for each dummy
variable corresponding to a surprising statement, we assigned a value of 1
for statements that would be expected to increase interest rates and a
value of –1 for statements that would be expected to lower interest rates.
Nonsurprising statements were coded as zeros. We then regressed the lev-
els of each of the three factors on the signed dummy variables, allowing
us to judge not only whether statements inﬂuenced expectations but also
whether expectations were inﬂuenced in the expected direction.
We added one further innovation to the analysis at this point. Our focus
thus far has been on the link at various horizons between central bank pol-
icy actions and statements, on the one hand, and interest rates, on the
other. However, the logic of quantitative easing and targeted asset pur-
chases implies that the most important effects of these policies may be felt
on the prices of assets other than government bonds. To investigate this
possibility, we included a fourth candidate factor in this event study,
deﬁned as the portion of the change in the Nikkei 500 stock index during
the event window that is orthogonal to the other three factors. That is, the
fourth factor reﬂects the impact of the BOJ’s action and statement on prices
of Japanese equities (an important alternative class of asset), holding
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BOJ policy decisions are inﬂuencing asset prices other than through
expectational channels, this factor should pick that up.
The results, shown in table 11, amplify but also generally conﬁrm the
results discussed earlier in this section. We saw earlier that surprises in
the policy setting (the ﬁrst factor) and in the statement tend to be associ-
ated in Japan. Column 11-1 of table 11 shows that these surprises tend to
be in the same direction (that is, both toward tightening or both toward
ease), consistent with the earlier discussion. Further, as column 11-2 shows,
unanticipated changes in the policy setting also seemed to be associated
with statements that provide information on the future path of policy (that
is, the PATH SURPRISE dummy accounts for the entire relationship
between the ﬁrst factor and statement surprises). This result is driven pri-
marily by the announcements of the ZIRP and the quantitative easing pro-
gram, which, as already mentioned, were associated with surprises in the
policy setting as well.
We continue to ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between the second fac-
tor (the innovation in year-ahead policy expectations) and BOJ state-
ments, even with this ﬁner categorization of statements (columns 11-3
and 11-4). This result is the strongest and most important contrast
between the ﬁndings for the BOJ and for the Federal Reserve.
The level of the third factor (which, again, corresponds to the ﬂuctua-
tion in the yield on JGBs during the event window that is not explained by
current or year-ahead policy expectations) appears to be linked with cer-
tain types of statements. As column 11-6 shows, a statement that surprises
the market in suggesting that policy will be tighter in the future (that is, a
positive path surprise) causes ﬁve-year yields to fall; the effect is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding can be rationalized by the argument that a
near-term tightening lowers inﬂation expectations and thus nominal inter-
est rates at long horizons. Perhaps more interesting, the third factor also
has a statistically signiﬁcant link to JGB surprises; that is, BOJ statements
announcing unexpectedly large targets for JGB purchases (an easing
move, therefore coded as –1) are associated with declines in the yield on
ﬁve-year JGBs, as should be the case if targeted bond purchases by the
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87. It turns out that 99.2 percent of the variance of stock prices during the event win-
dow is orthogonal to the ﬁrst three factors; that is, almost all of the change in stock prices is
explained by the fourth factor, unrelated to interest rates.
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statistically signiﬁcant, is not large (5 basis points) and is of necessity
based on relatively few observations.
The results for the fourth factor, which is essentially the change in
stock prices during the event window, are of interest. Columns 11-7 and
11-8 of table 11 show that the Japanese stock market index drops between
1 and 2 percent on average when the BOJ issues a surprisingly hawkish
statement. The statistically strongest link is to BOJ announcements of
new current account balance targets. Inspection of the data shows that, on
three of the six occasions when the BOJ made surprise announcements of
increases in its target for current account balances, the Nikkei 500 rose
between 3 and 6 percent, including a 5.9 percent increase on the
announcement of the quantitative easing policy. On one other such occa-
sion the market rose nearly 2 percent. Thus, in the event study at least,
quantitative easing appears to provide a positive impetus to the stock mar-
ket, with both current and future interest rate expectations held constant.
Two general conclusions emerge from the BOJ event study. First,
there is little evidence that the BOJ used its statements to influence near-
term policy expectations during this period. This contradicts the finding
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Table 11. Regressions of Factors on Signed Dummy Variables for Bank of Japan
Policy Statementsa
Dependent variable
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Independent 
variable 11-1 11-2 11-3 11-4 11-5 11-6 11-7 11-8
SIGNED 4.75** 1.1 0.5 –1.12
STATEMENT (4.80) (1.14) (1.11) (–1.90)
SURPRISE
SIGNED PATH 9.8** –2.2 –6.3** –1.94
SURPRISE (4.13) (–1.01) (–2.54) (–1.45)
SIGNED JGB  0.9 –2.7 5.1** –1.16
SURPRISE (0.53) (–1.64) (2.80) (–1.17)
SIGNED CAB  0.4 0.4 –0.0 –1.70**
SURPRISEb (0.26) (0.28) (–0.02) (–2.0)
Adjusted R2 .17 .16 .01 .03 .06 .13 .02 .10
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Factors are as deﬁned in table 9. Independent variables are deﬁned in a manner analogous to the deﬁnitions in tables 2 and
3 for the United States. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics; ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 95 percent level.
b. CAB, current account balances (at commercial banks).
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Second, our findings provide some tentative support for the view that
asset prices respond to quantitative easing and targeted asset purchases;
specifically, we find statistically significant links between JGB pur-
chases and JGB yields on the one hand, and between quantitative easing
and stock prices on the other. Whether these latter effects were large
enough to have a significant influence on the Japanese economy will be
addressed next.
A Benchmark Term Structure Model for Japan
As a ﬁnal exercise, we estimate a benchmark term structure model for
Japan and compare the results with actual term structure behavior. As in
the U.S. case, the model is a no-arbitrage affine term structure model
driven by observable factors. The underlying factors are assumed to be
the unemployment rate, the inﬂation rate (the twelve-month change in the
consumer price index), the overnight call rate, and the year-ahead Euro-
yen futures rate. These variables are closely analogous to those used for
the U.S. estimation, except that we do not have a monthly inﬂation expec-
tations measure for Japan to include. The dynamics of the factors are deter-
mined by an estimated VAR with four lags, where the estimation uses
monthly data over the sample period June 1982 to May 2004.88
With the estimated VAR in hand, we then ﬁt the no-arbitrage term
structure model using data from the JGB market. The data on JGB yields
are month-average zero-coupon yields at maturities of six months and
one, two, three, ﬁve, seven, and ten years, obtained from Bloomberg for
the period since April 1989. The prices of risk are estimated using yield
curve data from April 1989 to December 1997, based on the VAR dynam-
ics estimated over the full sample. The ﬁt of the model is quite good (ﬁg-
ure 10). We show the ﬁt of the model through 1997 only; as we will
discuss next, for the period after 1997 we need to make an adjustment for
the proximity of short-term yields to the ZLB.
When short-term interest rates fall to very low levels, the ZLB con-
straint begins to inﬂuence the shape of the yield curve. One effect is that
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88. Data on the Euroyen futures rate are available only from June 1989; for earlier
dates we regressed the futures rate on the ﬁve-year JGB yield and the call rate for the sam-
ple period June 1989 to May 1999 and used the ﬁtted values from this regression as a proxy
for the actual futures rate.
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Datastream, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and Bloomberg.
a. The predicted yields are generated by the term structure model, as described in the text. The risk-neutral yields are generated 
by the same model, but with the prices of risk set equal to zero.
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eliminates them at short-term maturities), which limits the scope for capi-
tal gains on ﬁxed-income securities. To compensate for this, investors
will demand higher yields on ﬁxed-income assets,89 thereby steepening
the yield curve.
We can account for this effect in our VAR model. The price of a two-
year note, for example, should equal the expected product of the pricing
kernel over the next twenty-four months:
We computed the bond price deﬁned by equation 9 by performing 10,000
simulations of the model over the subsequent twenty-four months, deter-
mining the path of the pricing kernel in each iteration, and then taking the
average of the product of the pricing kernel over all simulations. This
exercise can be performed either ignoring the ZLB or imposing it.
If we perform the simulations without imposing the ZLB, the predicted
bond prices will (asymptotically) be the same as those obtained directly
from the VAR (such as those shown in ﬁgure 10), since the VAR dynam-
ics do not recognize the presence of the ZLB constraint. To impose the
ZLB, in each simulation we assume that, in any month that the policy rate
would go negative, there is a shock to the policy rate sufﬁcient to pull it
back to zero.90 We can rigorously price ﬁxed-income assets according to
equation 9 under these alternative simulations, which then allows us to
estimate the effects of the ZLB on the term structure. In this exercise we
account for the fact that investors, in valuing bonds, take into account the
effect of the ZLB on the future path of short-term interest rates, as well as
its effects on all of the state variables that affect the prices of risk.91
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89. As described in Bomﬁm (2003); see also Ruge-Murcia (2002).
90. The year-ahead futures rate is assumed to respond endogenously to these policy
shocks, based on a Cholesky decomposition in which the policy rate is ordered second to
last and the futures rate is ordered last. Without this endogenous response, the futures rate
would often go negative.
91. This exercise seems to get us a long way toward properly accounting for the effects
of the ZLB on the term structure of interest rates, but it still has some shortcomings. Specif-
ically, the dynamics of the VAR and the relationship between risk prices and economic
variables may change in important ways near the zero bound, so that their dynamics are not
well captured by the VAR with policy shocks. A similar criticism applies to other work on
the effects of the ZLB, such as that of Bomﬁm (2003).
2581-01_Bernanke_rev.qxd    1/18/05    13:13    Page  74Figure 11 shows the results from this exercise for four representative
months: December 1998 (several months before the introduction of the
ZIRP), May 1999 (several months after its introduction), November 2000
(several months after the end of the ZIRP but before the introduction of
the quantitative easing policy), and June 2001 (several months after the
introduction of the quantitative easing policy). The inﬂuence of the ZLB
(shown by the shift in the predicted yield curve) is to shift the yield curve
upward in all cases, the magnitude of the shift depending on the proxim-
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Figure 11. Yield Curve on Zero-Coupon Japanese Government Bonds before and
after Bank of Japan Policy Announcements
Percent a year
December 1998 May 1999
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Years to maturity Years to maturity
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sidering the ZLB) tend to lie above the corresponding actual yield curves.
In other words, the VAR term structure model has difﬁculty explaining
the low JGB yields during this period.
This result holds even though the VAR offers a very pessimistic view
of the Japanese economy over this period. For most of the period since
1998, the VAR predicts that deﬂation will persist for some time and that
short-term interest rates will remain very low. This forecast, however,
probably should be regarded with some skepticism. The VAR is estimated
over a sample period in which unemployment was rising and inﬂation
falling; as a result, it ﬁnds that these variables are very persistent and
extrapolates these trends. One could presumably improve upon that fore-
cast by taking into consideration additional information or a more detailed
model. Nevertheless, the interesting ﬁnding for our purposes is that, even
given the VAR’s downbeat projections of short-term interest rates, actual
longer-term JGB yields seem to have been even lower than projected by
the model.
An interesting question, then, is whether the low level of JGB yields
was associated with the policies of the BOJ. Figure 11 suggests that the
ZIRP and the quantitative easing policy may have played some role: the
deviation between the predicted yields (taking account of the ZLB) and
actual yields widened after the introduction of the ZIRP, narrowed once
the policy was abandoned, and widened again after the introduction of the
quantitative easing policy. Also of interest is that, in May 1999, after the
introduction of the ZIRP, the spread between actual and predicted yields
is greatest at the short end of the maturity structure—a result consistent
with earlier research on the ZIRP, as discussed above.
As noted earlier, assessing the effects of the ZIRP and especially the
quantitative easing policy is in general difﬁcult because of the problems
of controlling for other factors that inﬂuenced yields over the periods
when these policies were in effect. It is intriguing that, when we control
(at least roughly) for macroeconomic conditions and the current stance of
monetary policy, as well as for the effects on longer-term rates of the
option created by the presence of the ZLB, we still ﬁnd that the Japanese
term structure has recently been lower than predicted. Moreover, the devi-
ation of the actual term structure and the predicted pattern of yields
increased immediately following the introduction of the ZIRP and later of
the quantitative easing policy. This evidence, more than the event-study
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policies in Japan have been effective at lowering longer-term interest
rates. Whether the lower rates led to a material strengthening of the econ-
omy is beyond the scope of our discussion.
Conclusion
This paper has developed new empirical evidence on the likely effects
of nonstandard monetary policies when nominal interest rates are near
their zero lower bound. Although the evidence is to some degree indirect,
it generally supports the view that nonstandard policies would be effec-
tive when the policy rate is at zero. Notably, the Federal Reserve has suc-
cessfully used its communications to affect expectations of future policies
and thus longer-term yields. We also ﬁnd some evidence that relative sup-
plies of securities matter for yields in the United States, a necessary con-
dition for achieving the desired effects from targeted asset purchases. The
event studies for Japan provide only limited evidence that the Bank of
Japan has been successful in using nonstandard policies, but the analysis
based on an estimated model of the term structure for that country does
suggest that longer-term yields have been lower than might have been
expected in recent years. The latter result holds open the possibility that
the zero-interest-rate policy and quantitative easing policies have had
expansionary effects.
Despite ﬁnding evidence that alternative policy measures may prove
effective, we remain cautious about relying on such approaches. We
believe that our ﬁndings go some way toward refuting the strong hypoth-
esis that nonstandard policy actions, including quantitative easing and
targeted asset purchases, cannot be successful in a modern industrial
economy. However, the effects of such policies remain quantitatively
quite uncertain. Thus we believe that policymakers should continue to
maintain an inﬂation buffer and to act preemptively against emerging
deﬂationary risks.92 There are trade-offs, of course, in that erring toward
the side of ease when rates are low tends to create an inﬂation bias, but the
goal of zero inﬂation seems unwise in any case. Moreover, a systematic
tendency to err toward an easier policy when adverse shocks bulk large
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unwind that accommodation quickly once the situation clears.
Shaping investor expectations through communication does appear to
be a viable strategy, as suggested by Eggertsson and Woodford.93 By per-
suading the public that the policy rate will remain low for a longer period
than expected, central bankers can reduce long-term rates and provide
some impetus to the economy, even if the short-term rate is close to zero.
However, for credibility to be maintained, the central bank’s commit-
ments must be consistent with the public’s understanding of the policy-
makers’ objectives and outlook for the economy.
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Discussion
Benjamin M. Friedman: This paper by Ben Bernanke, Vincent Reinhart,
and Brian Sack is a welcome contribution to the new line of literature that
examines, in a far more eclectic way than used to be done, how monetary
policy works and what effects it has on the ﬁnancial markets and the non-
ﬁnancial economy. The paper is valuable both because the question it asks
is important—whether what the authors call nonstandard policy measures
can be effective when ordinary monetary policy actions are constrained by
the zero lower bound on short-term nominal interest rates—and because
the analysis it brings to bear on this question is largely empirical. The paper
also reaches what I regard as a sensible conclusion: that the potential efﬁ-
cacy of these nonstandard measures notwithstanding, it is wise for mone-
tary policy both to aim at an inﬂation rate distinctly above zero, so as to
allow for a buffer against disinﬂationary shocks, and to ease policy pre-
emptively when necessary to avoid signiﬁcant risk of hitting the zero
lower bound on interest rates. Finally, the paper is important also because
of who wrote it, but more on that below.
The authors consider three conceptually distinct classes of nonstan-
dard monetary policy measures: central bank communications, changes
in the size of the central bank’s balance sheet, and changes in the compo-
sition of the central bank’s balance sheet. (The last of these is what would
normally be called debt management policy if it were executed by a coun-
try’s ﬁscal authority rather than by its central bank.) It is important to point
out, however—and this is the focus of my one major concern about the
paper—that even when the authors are addressing the effects of changes in
the size or composition of the central bank’s balance sheet, what they are
actually analyzing in their empirical work is still communications. Most
79
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ments regarding intended future actions. Even when they examine such
episodes as the U.S. Treasury’s buyback of Treasury securities, during the
happy but all-too-brief period in the late 1990s when the U.S. government
ran surprisingly large budget surpluses instead of shamefully large deﬁcits,
their attention is more on what the Treasury said than on what it did.
In principle, of course, credible statements about future actions should
matter for the pricing of medium- and long-term assets in speculative mar-
kets. The ground for concern is rather in how this approach to addressing
questions of monetary policy reinforces the increasingly exclusive focus in
recent literature on what many economists engaged in this line of research
(for example, Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford in a Brookings
Paper last year)1 call “expectations management.”
Surely everyone today believes that expectations matter, and therefore
that whatever inﬂuences the public’s expectations, including communica-
tion from the central bank, matters as well. I am also sympathetic to the
authors’ presumption that, when an economy has reached the zero lower
bound on short-term interest rates, central bank communications may be
even more important than normally. But the net impression, delivered
both by the authors’ discussion and by the battery of empirical tests they
perform, nonetheless resonates too strongly, at least for my taste, with the
idea, which they attribute to Eggertsson and Woodford, that “shaping the
interest rate expectations of the public is essentially the only tool that cen-
tral bankers have—not only when the ZLB binds, but under normal con-
ditions as well.” (I will not repeat here my criticism of this view, but
interested readers can refer to my remarks as a discussant of the Eggerts-
son-Woodford paper.)
This concern aside, I regard the authors’ empirical analysis of the effect
of Federal Reserve and Treasury statements on market interest rates as
carefully crafted, and I ﬁnd their conclusions easily credible. I especially
admire their willingness to go beyond the standard event studies and use a
multifactor term structure model to try to identify the role of “surprise”
elements of Federal Reserve statements, as distinct from the policy actions
that these statements accompanied. One might quibble with some of the
details, and no doubt subsequent researchers will suggest alternative spec-
iﬁcations, but that is not my purpose.
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say what they think of the speciﬁcs of the two recent Federal Open Market
Committee statements they examine: the August 2003 statement that
“policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period”
and the May 2004 statement that the committee intends to remove pol-
icy accommodation “at a pace that is likely to be measured.” How do
they think these statements measure up to the now-conventional mantra
that central bank communications with the market (and the general pub-
lic) should be clear and transparent? What are we to read into their
highly quotable remark about “policymaking by thesaurus”? FOMC
practice may perhaps require a certain opacity, but publication in the
Brookings Papers presumably does not.
The authors’ extended analysis of what amounts to debt management
policy (actually, statements about debt management policy) is a further
strength of the paper, and it, too, merits comment. The basic principle at
work here is that the vector of market-clearing expected returns on all
traded assets emerges as a consequence of the equilibrium of respective
asset supplies and asset demands. Given the conditions underlying the
public’s asset demands—importantly including the risk properties of
speciﬁc assets, investors’ risk tolerance, and investors’ assessment of the
magnitudes of various risks and of the relationships among them—changes
in the relative supplies of any “outside” assets (that is, assets supplied
by issuers, such as government, whose portfolio behavior lies outside the
model of market equilibrium) normally result in changes in the entire
vector of market-clearing relative returns. Whether the degree of imper-
fect substitutability among the relevant assets (especially longer-term
obligations that are likely to be closer substitutes to equities and other
claims on capital) is sufficient to render policy interventions of this kind
potentially important is then an empirical question.
The authors rightly question the familiar presumption that the Federal
Reserve’s “Operation Twist” effort in the early 1960s provides evidence
against the effectiveness of debt management policy. Not only did the
Treasury’s choice of maturity for its new issues offset the Federal
Reserve’s policy of buying in long bonds and selling bills, as James
Tobin often rightly pointed out; indeed, the situation was worse than
that. Treasury data show that the early 1960s was a quite exceptional
time. In the three decades immediately following World War II, during
which the mean maturity of the outstanding Treasury debt declined from
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mean maturity lengthened. Why should the yield curve have flattened
during these few years?
The authors’ empirical efforts show a modest impact on the yield curve
from the Treasury’s statements about its late-1990s buyback program. 
I find these estimates credible. Indeed, they are close to what I myself
found some years ago, using a structural supply-demand model for dif-
ferent debt instruments to estimate the impact of debt management policy.
Speciﬁcally, I used my estimated model to simulate the effects of a switch
out of long-term Treasury bonds and into short-term Treasury bills, in
a quantity that was fairly large back in the pre-Reagan days when there
was not much debt outstanding. My estimates indicated that, in
response, the Treasury bill rate would rise by 18 basis points, the rate on
three- to five-year securities would rise by 7 basis points, the rate on
six- to eight-year maturities would fall by 21 basis points, and the rate
on thirty-year maturities would fall by 25 basis points. These higher bill
rates and lower bond rates, in turn, would induce private borrowers to
shift their debt issuance from the short toward the long end of the avail-
able maturity range. As a result, although the rate on long-term govern-
ment bonds went down by 25 basis points in my estimates, the rate on
long-term corporate bonds—which is presumably what matters more for
real economic activity—went down by only 12 basis points.
My only reservation about this part of the paper concerns the framing of
the analysis in terms of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
What the authors are investigating is debt management policy (or, to
repeat, statements about debt management policy). There is no reason to
believe that the effects of debt management policy are any larger at or near
the zero lower bound, nor is it necessarily the case that debt management
policy is uninteresting away from the zero lower bound.
My reaction to the authors’ treatment of changes in the size of the
central bank’s balance sheet likewise focuses not on what they did or
what they found, but on how they describe this inquiry. Although they
are careful to use language that does not make the point explicit, the
question they are really asking here is whether changes in the quantity
of money matter—even for prices! And their answer is mostly no, or at least
that they do not matter under the economic conditions they have in mind.
It is a mark of how far the economics profession has come in the last
two decades that it is possible to ask this question, and to give this answer,
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omists (although not everyone around the Brookings Panel table) auto-
matically assumed that increasing the money stock would lead, at the
least, to rising prices. Changes in money were what monetary policy was
about. The idea that, once interest rates fell low enough, money and short-
term securities became perfect substitutes, so that further increases in
money no longer mattered and monetary policy became impotent—that
policymakers could not “push on a string”—was anathema. Today the
whole conversation about monetary policy is couched in terms of interest
rates, and any notion that the central bank would seek to increase or
decrease the quantity of money, or that such changes in money would
have any effect, in the absence of changes in interest rates is labeled “non-
standard.” Indeed, the whole discussion now takes place without requir-
ing mention of the word “money.” Who ever said there is no such thing as
intellectual progress?
Two smaller matters also merit at least some comment: First, why does
the deﬁnition of a “pure pegging policy” require that the central bank
match purchases or sales of the pegged security with sales or purchases of
some other security, rather than with changes in the monetary base? In a
model with only one kind of bond, “pegging the interest rate” always
means being willing to vary the monetary base for this purpose. Why pre-
clude that usage in a world with two or more kinds of bonds? And second,
although I understand the desire of policymakers to take credit for all
sorts of beneﬁts that follow from “greater stability in the economy and in
policy,” I suspect that a major contributor to the decline in long-horizon
risk premiums over the last decade and more, to which the authors point,
has been the improvement in the efﬁciency and availability of the mar-
ket’s hedging facilities.
Let me close by returning to my remark at the outset that one reason
this paper is welcome is simply that the authors are who they are. I have
always regretted a certain cultural difference between policymakers in
different domains: It is de rigueur for former active participants in foreign
policy, for example, to write after-the-fact accounts of how policies were
made, typically including details of the push and pull of how their institu-
tion or organization went about reaching its decisions. The practice
among monetary policymakers, by contrast, is far more close-mouthed
(or empty-penned). One can cite Sherman Maisel’s book of a generation
ago, and more recently books by Alan Blinder and Laurence Meyer, as
Ben S. Bernanke, Vincent R. Reinhart, and Brian P. Sack 83
2581-01_Bernanke_rev.qxd    1/18/05    13:13    Page  83well as by John Crow in Canada. But the serious student of the subject
longs for books that were never written—in the United States alone by
William McChesney Martin, Allen Sproul, Alfred Hayes, or other key
players of that day; by Paul Volcker, or Anthony Solomon, or Gerald Cor-
rigan; or by Alan Greenspan (although his would still be premature). Such
books might not have the same public appeal as the classics of diplomacy
by George Kennan and Dean Acheson and Henry Kissinger, but for stu-
dents of our discipline they would be invaluable. I hope Governor
Bernanke continues to engage in written reﬂection and analysis of his and
his colleagues’ actions, and of the thinking and discussions behind those
actions, and that the book he will write in time will add to a literature that
still stands much in need of further contributions.
Lars E. O. Svensson:1 This paper by Ben Bernanke, Vincent Reinhart,
and Brian Sack is an important and interesting one, with a good theoretical
discussion of and new empirical results on monetary policy alternatives at
the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. The paper is impor-
tant and interesting also for the obvious reason that two of its authors are
important and inﬂuential insiders at the Federal Reserve System. Notwith-
standing the qualiﬁcation that the views expressed are not necessarily
shared by anyone else in the organization, the paper reveals some aspects
of the Federal Reserve’s thinking about and preparation for the possibility
that the ZLB might bind at some future time.
I have no disagreements with the substance of the paper or the empiri-
cal results that the authors ﬁnd. However, I believe that the paper’s focus
and emphasis are not quite right.
Consider a liquidity trap—a situation when the ZLB is strictly binding,
in the sense that it prevents the central bank from setting the interest rate
that is its instrument rate (the federal funds rate, in the case of the Federal
Reserve) at its optimal level. What is the problem in a liquidity trap? The
problem is that, even though the instrument rate is at zero, the real (short-
term) interest rate is too high, and as a consequence the economy is in a
recession or inﬂation is too low (perhaps even negative), or both. The cen-
tral bank would prefer a lower real interest rate and a more expansionary
monetary policy stance, if that were possible.
How can the problem be solved? The central bank can lower the real
interest rate if it can induce the private sector to expect a higher price level
in the future. If expected inﬂation increases, the real interest rate falls, even
84 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
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bank induce such expectations of a higher future price level? Indeed, this is
the real problem in a liquidity trap. Consequently, in assessing policy alter-
natives in a liquidity trap, the focus should be on how effective each of
those alternatives is in affecting expectations of the future price level. In
this paper, however, the focus is mostly on affecting expectations of future
interest rates, which is likely to be much less effective.2
Price-Level Expectations in a Liquidity Trap
Let me illustrate with a simple New Keynesian model. Let xt ≡ yt − y −
t
denote the output gap in the current period t, where yt denotes (log) output
and y
−
t (log) potential output. Potential output is assumed to be an exoge-
nous stochastic process. Let rt denote the (short-term) real interest rate:
where  it denotes the nominal interest rate (the instrument rate), πt +1  t
denotes private sector expectations of one-period-ahead inﬂation,  pt
denotes the (log) price level, and pt +1  t denotes the expected one-period-
ahead (log) price level. Let r −
t denote the neutral (real) interest rate—that
is, the Wicksellian natural interest rate, the real interest rate that would
arise in a hypothetical ﬂexible-price economy with output equal to poten-
tial output. In the simplest case, the neutral interest rate is given by
where ρt is the rate of time preference (an exogenous stochastic process)
and the positive constant σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for consumption. Hence the neutral interest rate is determined by the
rate of time preference and expected growth of potential output. The
output gap depends positively on the expected future output gap, xt +1  t,
ry y tt tt t ≡+ () − () + ρσ 1 1 ,
ri i p p tt tt t tt t ≡− ≡− − () ++ π 11 ,
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2. Although, in some cases, a particular path of future interest rates may induce desir-
able price-level expectations in equilibrium, this way of affecting price-level expectations
is certainly very indirect and in practice fraught with many difﬁculties. Furthermore, an
interest rate commitment alone may not be sufﬁcient to uniquely determine the price level,
as emphasized long ago by Sargent and Wallace (1975) and more recently—in the context
of a liquidity trap—by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002).
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t, according to the fol-
lowing aggregate demand relation:
which follows from a first-order condition for optimal consumption
choice. The aggregate demand relation can be solved forward to period 
t + T:
This expression shows that the current output gap depends positively on
the expected output gap T periods ahead, xt+T t, and negatively on the sum
of the current and expected future real interest rate gaps, rt+τ  t − r −
t+τ t, for
the next T periods. I assume that the horizon T is chosen such that the
economy is expected to be back to normal by then, in the sense that the out-
put gap is expected to be approximately equal to zero, xt+T t ≈ 0. The cur-
rent output gap then depends only on the sum of the current and expected
future real interest rate gaps for the next T periods. If the current output
gap is negative (the economy is in recession), the reason is that the sum of
the current and expected future real interest rate gaps is too large—that is,
the current and expected real interest rates are too high relative to the cor-
responding neutral interest rates.
Under the assumption that the economy is expected to be back to nor-
mal T periods ahead, the current output gap can be written as
where the ﬁrst equality uses the deﬁnition of the real interest rate, and the
second equality uses the fact that the sum of future inﬂation equals the
total change in the (log) price level. I also assume that the economy is
expected to be in or close to a liquidity trap during the next T periods, so
that the expected instrument rates for that period are approximately
zero, it+τ t ≈ 0 (0 ≤τ≤T − 1). Then the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is
approximately zero. For a given current price level pt (I assume that the
current price level is sticky), the output gap depends only on the ex-
xi r
ip pr
t tt t t tt
T
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neutral interest rates during the next T periods. If the output gap is nega-
tive, so that the economy is in a recession, this is for two reasons: the 
sum of the current and expected future neutral interest rates,  is 
too small, and the sum of the current and expected future real interest rates,
is too large. That is, the expected future price level,
pt+T t, is too low. It follows that the real interest rate can be lowered and
the negative output gap reduced or eliminated if the central bank can
induce private sector expectations of a higher future price level.
However, this paper is mostly about reducing the negative output gap
by inducing private sector expectations of lower future instrument rates.
Thus, in the case when the expected future instrument rates during the
next T periods are not exactly zero but positive, they can perhaps be
reduced further toward zero. However, these rates are already low, and
therefore what can be gained from reducing them is small. Furthermore, it
may be possible to induce the private sector to expect instrument rates
close to zero after period T as well, after the liquidity trap is over. In the
above framework, this would amount to creating expectations of a posi-
tive rather than a zero output gap T periods ahead, xt+T t > 0, which would
reduce the current negative output gap. It seems likely that any such
attempt to lower expectations of future instrument rates toward zero, when
these expectations are already low to start with, will have very small, sec-
ond-order effects on the current output gap.
In contrast, there is potentially a large ﬁrst-order effect on the output
gap from increasing expectations of the future price level. This is where I
wish the focus of this paper had been.
How Can the Central Bank Affect Expectations of the 
Future Price Level?
The insight that the solution to the problem of a liquidity trap involves
affecting private sector expectations of the future price level is due to
Paul Krugman.3 Krugman also noted that this principal solution immedi-
ately encounters a practical problem, namely, a credibility problem, in
that it is not easy for a central bank to purposely affect such expectations.
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low-inflation policy finds it difficult to convince the private sector that
it has suddenly changed its mind and wants the price level to increase
substantially.
expanding the money supply. One possible way to affect expecta-
tions of the future price level is by increasing the money supply: what the
paper refers to as increasing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet.
As Krugman noted, this is effective only if the private sector perceives the
increase in the money supply to be permanent. Unfortunately, there is no
mechanism through which a modern central bank can commit itself to a
particular future money supply.
We can see this in the above framework. Let us assume that the horizon
T is chosen such that the liquidity trap is expected to be over and interest
rates are expected to be positive beginning in period t + T: it+T t > 0. To a
ﬁrst approximation, we may take demand for the monetary base to be pro-
portional to nominal GDP when interest rates are positive. This implies
(disregarding any constant)
where mt+T t denotes the expected (log) monetary base T periods ahead. That
is, as an approximation, the expected future price level is directly related
positively to the expected future monetary base and negatively to the
expected future output level. If the central bank could affect private sector
expectations of the future monetary base, it would, all else equal, also affect
private sector expectations of the future price level to the same extent.
Unfortunately, it is not easy for a central bank to directly affect expec-
tations of the future monetary base. The Japanese liquidity trap and the
Bank of Japan’s response to it provide an unusually clear-cut example. In
March 2001 the Bank of Japan instituted its new policy of “quantitative
easing,” which consisted of a dramatic expansion of the monetary base.
By the summer of 2004, the monetary base had increased by more than
60 percent. Suppose that the private sector believes this expansion to be
permanent. The private sector would then believe that, some time in the
future (for concreteness, say, in four years) when the Japanese liquidity
trap is over, nominal GDP will have risen by more than 60 percent. Sup-
pose that the private sector believes that Japanese real GDP in the next
four years will rise by only some 10 to 15 percent. The private sector
would then believe that, four years hence, the price level will be some
pmy tT t tT t tT t ++ + ≈− ,
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would depreciate by some 40 to 45 percent, or Japanese long-term interest
rates would rise substantially, or some combination of the two would
occur. In fact, neither has occurred. The obvious conclusion is that the
private sector does not believe that the expansion of the monetary base is
permanent. The quantitative easing has not affected price-level expecta-
tions. It appears to be a dramatic failure.
an inﬂation target or a price-level target. An inﬂation target
or, better, a price-level target would be a fine solution, if it were credi-
ble. However, merely announcing the target would not be enough: the
announcement would have to be combined with statements and actions
that make it credible. This seems to be a particular problem for central
banks like the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan, since they have
clearly demonstrated over many years their notorious aversion to any
numerical target or other explicit commitment.
ﬁscal policy. A ﬁscal expansion—an increase in the ﬁscal deﬁcit—
may or may not be expansionary and increase aggregate demand, depend-
ing on the composition of the ﬁscal expenditure, the degree of Ricardian
equivalence, and so forth. Typically, Ricardian equivalence does not seem
to hold, and a ﬁscal deﬁcit is expansionary; however, private sector behav-
ior may be closer to Ricardian equivalence in a crisis, with a ﬁscal deﬁcit
that is perceived to be unsustainable and an expected imminent ﬁscal con-
solidation through increased taxes, reduced spending, or both. Japan has
certainly tried to implement an expansionary ﬁscal policy, but this, too, has
failed to free Japan from the liquidity trap, although it has certainly led to a
dramatic deterioration of Japan’s public ﬁnances.
A money-ﬁnanced rather than debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion is often
proposed as a remedy for a liquidity trap. But often it is not understood
that, for a given ﬁscal deﬁcit, and aside from any debt-induced inﬂation
incentives for government-controlled (rather than independent) central
banks, both money and debt financing work through exactly the same
mechanism discussed above in regard to expanding the money supply.
Money ﬁnancing of a ﬁscal expansion will affect expectations of the future
price level only to the extent that it is interpreted as a permanent expansion
of the money supply. Again, since there is no mechanism by which the
central bank can commit to a future money supply, current money ﬁnanc-
ing of a deficit does not exclude the possibility that the money supply
will be reduced in the future. Money ﬁnancing of a ﬁscal expansion hence
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future price level.
empirical assessment of policy alternatives in a liquidity trap.
In line with the above discussion, the empirical assessment of alternative
policies in a liquidity trap should focus on their impact on price-level
expectations. An obvious problem is that there are very few examples of
this approach being taken, and so a case study approach seems the only
feasible one. The “Rooseveltian Resolve” of 1933–34 seems a good case
to examine from this point of view, with its devaluation, its new commit-
ment to end deﬂation and reﬂate the economy, and its associated impres-
sion of a regime change.4 An examination of price expectations data from
this period would prove interesting. Generally, it seems more relevant and
revealing to look at price expectations data than interest rate expectations
data when assessing alternative policies in a liquidity trap. In particular,
one may want to look at data on the effect of central bank communication
on price-level expectations.
the foolproof way. In several recent papers,5 I have promoted what
I call the “Foolproof Way” as an effective policy to escape from a liquid-
ity trap. The Foolproof Way involves, ﬁrst, the announcement and imple-
mentation of a price-level target; second, a currency depreciation and peg
consistent with the price-level target; and, third, an exit strategy, to be
undertaken when the price-level target has been reached, in which the
currency is ﬂoated and inﬂation targeting or price-level targeting is instituted.
In terms of the above framework, the idea is to induce private sector
expectations of a higher future price level, such that the real interest rate
falls and the economy expands out of the liquidity trap. Let the price-level
target for period t + T, p ˆt, be such that price-level expectations satisfying
and zero instrument rates during the next T − 1 periods would be ade-
quate to achieve the desired fall in the real interest rate and increased
stimulus of the economy. Price-level expectations and exchange rate
expectations will be related according to
() , * 2 pspq tT t tT t tT t tT t +++ + =+−
() ˆ , 1 pp tT t tT t ++ =
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4. This episode is discussed by Bernanke (2000).
5. Svensson (2001, 2003, 2004); Jeanne and Svensson (2004).
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t denotes the (log) foreign price
level, and qt denotes the (log) real exchange rate. I assume that the hori-
zon T is chosen such that the economy is expected to be back to normal by
then, and in particular that it is chosen such that the real exchange rate is
expected to be back to its natural (neutral, potential) level,  q −
t+T t, and
hence can be treated as exogenous from the perspective of current mone-
tary policy. I also assume that the foreign price level can be taken as
exogenous. Under these assumptions the expected future price level and
the expected future exchange rate are directly related and move together.
By interest parity, the current exchange rate is related to the expected
future exchange rate and the interest rate differential between the home
and the foreign interest rate, it − i*
t, by
where the second equality follows from solving forward T periods. By
equation 2, we get
where the exogenous terms have been left out. The expectation that future
instrument rates will approximately equal zero implies that the current
exchange rate is directly related to and moves together with the expected
future price level. An increase in the expected future price level corre-
sponds to an equal current depreciation of the currency. The exchange rate
peg of the Foolproof Way implements the exchange rate consistent with
the future price-level target and the zero instrument rates.6 If the Foolproof
Way and its price-level target are immediately credible, price-level expec-
tations will rise to fulﬁll equation 1, and the currency will, by equation 2,
depreciate by the same amount, and the peg will not be binding. Other-
wise, the peg forces private sector price-level expectations to be consistent
with the price-level target.
Many comments on the Foolproof Way, including in this paper, have
suggested that a potential improvement in the trade balance due to cur-
rency depreciation under the peg may be problematic for the trading
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home instrument rate. A constant peg would imply a home instrument rate equal to the for-
eign short-term interest rate, but the practical difference is small.
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same as would result from a credible price-level target without any peg,
or a lower instrument rate, if that were not prevented by the ZLB. The
truth is that any expansionary monetary policy implies a real depreciation
and thus a trade balance effect. Furthermore, any net effect on the trade
balance from expansionary monetary policy will consist of income and
substitution effects of opposite signs. In a liquidity trap and a deep reces-
sion, the income effect on the trade balance may be particularly strong
and actually improve the trade balance for the trading partners. Finally,
nothing prevents the trading partners from conducting their own expan-
sionary monetary policy to counteract any contractionary effect from the
Foolproof Way. In this way, an optimal world monetary expansion might
be achieved.7
Changing the Composition of the Central Bank Balance Sheet
The paper also discusses changes in the composition of the central
bank balance sheet as a policy alternative in the vicinity of the ZLB.8 The
purpose of such a policy is to affect various risk premiums through port-
folio balance effects. For example, consider the relation between the
interest rate on a nominal discount bond with a maturity of T periods, i
T
t,
and the instrument rate,
Here ϕ
T
t denotes a term premium, which may depend on the relative 
supply of maturity-T government bonds, denoted B
T
t. If initially i
T
t is posi-
tive, by changing the composition of its assets so as to increase the pro-
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7. See Svensson (2004) for an analysis of the international effects of the Foolproof
Way. One possible problem with the Foolproof Way is that the central bank may have an
incentive to renege in the future through an unanticipated currency appreciation, so as to
achieve low inﬂation ex post. However, Jeanne and Svensson (2004) show—starting from
the fact that a currency appreciation reduces the home-currency value of foreign exchange
reserves, and given the strong aversion toward negative central bank capital revealed by
central bank ofﬁcials and noted by central bank commentators—that a central bank can
manage its capital so as to create a commitment not to appreciate the currency in the future.
8. Note that the management of central bank capital so as to create a commitment not to
appreciate the currency, discussed in Jeanne and Svensson (2004), is an example of a policy
that changes the composition of central bank capital (see note 6).
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lower the term premium, thereby lowering i
T
t toward zero. It is possible in
principle for central banks to lower the interest rate on longer-term bond
rates somewhat this way. The paper reports some very interesting empiri-
cal results on the Federal Reserve’s attempts to affect long-term interest
rates. But it is not clear that such attempts will have a substantial effect
on the current output gap. The impact is probably one of a few basis
points, or at most a few tens of basis points, on long-term bond rates that
are probably already low. Compared with changes in price-level expecta-
tions, it seems to be a second-order effect.9 Although the paper’s empiri-
cal results are very interesting and the analysis is well done, it seems
clear that we are talking about rather small effects.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it seems obvious that, in the face of a liquidity trap,
monetary policy should focus on policy alternatives that are capable of
affecting expectations of the future price level rather than just affecting
expectations of future interest rates. The effect of changing price-level
expectations and related exchange rates seems much more powerful
than that of changing long-term nominal interest rates or expectations of
future short-term interest rates that are already close to zero. Obviously,
there is no bound on prices or exchange rates similar to that on nominal
interest rates. Therefore I would like to see more theoretical and empir-
ical research on policies in a liquidity trap that focus on affecting price-
level expectations.
General discussion: Robert Gordon agreed with Lars Svensson on the
importance of distinguishing between the effects of monetary policy on
expectations about future interest rates and its effects on expectations
about the future price level. But he disagreed with the view that there is a
direct connection between monetary policy statements or actions and
expectations about the price level in an economy like the United States. In
his view the output gap and supply shocks such as changes in oil prices or
exchange rates are the major factors affecting inﬂation, and they do so
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central bank to affect expectations of the future price level, they have to
alter expectations of these variables. Even before the emergence of mod-
ern ﬁnancial markets, the monetary base, the instrument directly con-
trolled by policy, was not reliably related to either the money supply or
nominal output and prices. The classic example is 1938–39, during the
administration of Franklin Roosevelt, when the monetary base tripled in
the United States as gold ﬂowed in from Europe. Although the increase in the
money supply was substantial, it was far less in percentage terms than
the increase in the monetary base, and there was no jump in the price level.
The Japanese experience in the face of a liquidity trap in 2001 was similar.
Lars Svensson agreed that a liquidity trap is an extreme situation and
that in those circumstances it would be difﬁcult for any central bank to
affect expectations by announcing a price-level target. But, he argued,
the exchange rate is a much more effective means of affecting price-level
expectations. Furthermore, the exchange rate, unlike the nominal short-
term interest rate, has no zero bound. Olivier Blanchard remarked that a
currency devaluation would increase costs for some ﬁrms, which would
lead to an immediate increase in some prices and quickly affect expecta-
tions of the future price level. Gordon expressed his doubts, observing
that, following the 1992 breakup of the European Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism, the pass-through of the exchange rate change to domestic price lev-
els was far from complete.
Several Panel participants pursued the question of whether commu-
nications are effective during a liquidity trap. Robert Lawrence found
the evidence on the efficacy of such nonconventional monetary policy
mechanisms in normal times quite compelling, but he thought it risky to
assume the same results in the unusual circumstances of a liquidity trap.
This could be why such policies have not worked very well in Japan.
Adam Posen echoed Lawrence’s concern that announcement effects
may not work in a zero-interest-rate environment; he and Kenneth Kutt-
ner had written a paper that reported little impact of statements by the
Bank of Japan. William Nordhaus wondered whether one reason Japan
has not had success is the lack of a unified central bank with a highly
credible leader. John Leahy was also impressed with the evidence on the
effectiveness of central bank communication, but he emphasized that the
communications studied in the present paper were about monetary instru-
ments over which the Federal Reserve has clear control. It is not obvious
94 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
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about variables, such as the inﬂation rate, that are not under its direct con-
trol. Posen, reminding the Panel that a ﬁscal expansion brought an end to
the Great Depression, suggested analyzing the effects of coordinated mon-
etary and ﬁscal actions near the zero lower bound. Statements about a
coordinated monetary and ﬁscal policy in such circumstances were likely
to be more effective than statements about either one separately. Nordhaus
found the results on communications both interesting and persuasive. He
thought they were consistent with a 2003 paper by Ray Fair in the Journal
of International Money and Finance, which estimated the responses of
stocks, bonds, and the exchange rate to unexpected announcements in
ofﬁcial releases of various economic indicators. Of these “data shocks,”
those in employment reports had the largest effect on interest rates. How-
ever, Nordhaus questioned the authors’ interpretation of the United States
going off the gold standard as an example of quantitative easing, arguing
that Roosevelt’s action was essentially an exchange rate event. Ben Bernanke
replied that that devaluation could indeed be interpreted as a case of quan-
titative easing, because it freed up the money supply rather than changing
relative prices.
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